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Abstract
Independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that has the
same expressive power as existential second-order logic. In her Ph.D. thesis, Dechesne in-
troduces a variant of independence-friendly logic called IFG logic. We attempt to algebraize
IFG logic in the same way that Boolean algebra is the algebra of propositional logic and
cylindric algebra is the algebra of first-order logic.
We define independence-friendly cylindric set algebras and prove two main results. First,
every independence-friendly cylindric set algebra over a structure has an underlying Kleene
algebra. Moreover, the class of such underlying Kleene algebras generates the variety of all
Kleene algebras. Hence the equational theory of the class of Kleene algebras that underly
an independence-friendly cylindric set algebra is finitely axiomatizable. Second, every one-
dimensional independence-friendly cylindric set algebra over a structure has an underlying
monadic Kleene algebra. However, the class of such underlying monadic Kleene algebras
does not generate the variety of all monadic Kleene algebras. Finally, we offer a conjec-
ture about which subvariety of monadic Kleene algebras the class of such monadic Kleene
algebras does generate.
1 IFG Logic
Imagine a sentence of first-order logic. Most likely, it has an initial block of quantifiers. If
there are multiple quantifiers in the block, then some of the quantifiers are dependent on other
quantifiers. In fact, there is only one possible dependence relation among the quantifiers: later
quantifiers depend on prior quantifiers. Hence the dependence relation is a linear order. The
first attempt to allow dependence relations other than the usual one on the quantifiers of a
first-order sentence was made by Henkin [9]. He allowed the dependence relation to be a partial
order, rather than a linear order. For example, in the Henkin sentence(
∀x ∃y
∀z ∃w
)
φ(x, y, z, w)
the variable y depends only on x, while w depends only on z. It is a result due to Ehrenfeucht
[9] that the above quantifier is not definable in ordinary first-order logic. Later it was shown
independently by Enderton [7] and Walkoe [24] that first-order logic with these “branching
quantifiers” has the same expressive power as existential second-order logic.
Independence-friendly logic (IF logic) was introduced by Hintikka and Sandu [13] as a
way to allow arbitrary dependence relations between the quantifiers of a first-order sentence.
Independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of ordinary first-order logic in that every
ordinary first-order sentence has an independence-friendly counterpart that is true in exactly
the same models. However, the ability to specify arbitrary dependence relations between the
quantifiers (and even the connectives) means that there are far more sentences than before. It
turns out that a given independence-friendly sentence has the same expressive power as a pair
of contrary existential second-order sentences. In The Principles of Mathematics Revisited [12],
Hintikka argues that IF logic is the correct first-order logic and advocates for its adoption as
the foundation of mathematics.
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In IF logic the truth of a sentence (or formula) is defined in terms of games. Let φ be a
sentence, and let A be a suitable structure. Informally, the semantic game G(A, φ) is played
between two players, player 0 (Abe´lard) and player 1 (Elo¨ıse). Elo¨ıse’s goal is to verify the
sentence φ in the structure A, while Abe´lard’s goal is to falsify it. A familiar example from
calculus is the definition of continuity:
∀x∀ε(ε > 0→ ∃δ(δ > 0 ∧ ∀y(|x− y| < δ → |f(x)− f(y)| < ε))).
Given a function f , Abe´lard picks an x and an ε. If ε ≤ 0, Elo¨ıse wins. If ε > 0, Elo¨ıse chooses a
δ. If δ ≤ 0, Abe´lard wins. If δ > 0, Abe´lard chooses a y. If |x− y| ≥ δ, Elo¨ıse wins. Otherwise,
Elo¨ıse wins if |f(x)− f(y)| < ε, and Abe´lard wins if |f(x)− f(y)| ≥ ε.
Notice that Elo¨ıse winning a single play of the game is not sufficient to guarantee that f
is continuous. Likewise, Abe´lard winning a single play is not sufficient to show that f is not
continuous. What is required for f to be continuous is for Elo¨ıse to have a way to win every play
of the game, given correct play by both players—that is, Elo¨ıse must have a winning strategy.
Dually, f is not continuous if and only if Abe´lard has a winning strategy. By extension, a first-
order sentence is true in a model A if and only if Elo¨ıse has a winning strategy for the game
G(A, φ), and φ is false in A if and only if Abe´lard has a winning strategy for G(A, φ).
In IF logic a sentence is defined to be true in a model if Elo¨ıse has a winning strategy for the
corresponding semantic game. Dually, a sentence is false in a model if Abe´lard has a winning
strategy. For any ordinary first-order sentence φ the semantic game G(A, φ) is a two-player,
win-loss game of perfect information. Hence Zermelo’s theorem tells us that one of the two
players must have a winning strategy. Thus every ordinary first-order sentence is either true of
false. That is, one can prove the principle of bivalence for ordinary first-order sentences from
the game-theoretical definition of truth.
The extension beyond ordinary first-order logic comes from the fact that in IF logic one can
write down a sentence whose corresponding semantic game is not a game of perfect information
by restricting the information available to the existential player. For such a sentence it is no
longer the case that one of the two players must have a winning strategy. Thus it is possible for
a sentence in IF logic to be neither true nor false. For example, consider the sentence
∀x∃y/x(x = y).
First Abe´lard chooses an element of the universe and assigns it as the value of the variable x.
Then Elo¨ıse chooses an element of the universe and assigns it to y, but Elo¨ıse must make her
choice without knowing the value of x. If Elo¨ıse correctly guesses which element Abe´lard chose,
she wins. Otherwise Abe´lard wins. It should be clear that in any structure with at least two
elements, Elo¨ıse does not have a winning strategy. Therefore the sentence is not true. But
neither does Abe´lard have a winning strategy because there is always the possibility that Elo¨ıse
will guess correctly. Therefore the sentence is not false. It is worth noting that whether or not
a sentence is undetermined depends on the structure in which the semantic game is played. For
example, the sentence
∀x∃y/x(y ≤ x)
is neither true nor false in R, but it is true in N because Elo¨ıse can always choose 0.
In her Ph.D. thesis [6] Dechesne provides a rigorous mathematical foundation for an ex-
tension of IF logic in which one allows the information available to Elo¨ıse and Abe´lard to be
restricted. She calls her extension IFG logic (for “generalized independence-friendly logic”).
Her thesis is the basis for our work. With the possible exception of Proposition 1.5, none of the
results in the present section are original.
Instead of focusing on which quantifiers are independent of one another, it might seem more
natural to focus on which quantifiers depend on which other quantifiers. Va¨a¨na¨nen does exactly
that in his recent book Dependence Logic [23].
Cylindric algebra is the algebra of ordinary first-order logic in the same way that Boolean
algebra is the algebra of ordinary propositional logic. Cylindric algebra was first studied by
Henkin, Monk, and Tarski [10, 11]. The goal of this paper is to algebraize IFG logic in the
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same spirit as cylindric algebra. Our algebraization will depend heavily on the compositional
semantics for independence-friendly logic put forth by Hodges [14, 15].
1.1 Syntax
In regular first-order logic, a formula φ is a string of symbols that satisfies certain conditions,
and a variable x is said to occur in φ if the symbol “x” appears in the string. In our version
of IFG logic, each formula will be a pair 〈φ,X〉 where φ is a formula in the standard sense (a
string of symbols satisfying certain conditions) and X is a finite set of variables. A variable is
said to occur in 〈φ,X〉 if and only if it belongs to X . We require that any variable that appears
in φ must belong to X . However, we will allow variables that do not appear in φ to belong to
X . Thus every variable that appears in φ must occur in 〈φ,X〉, but a variable may occur in
〈φ,X〉 without appearing in φ.
Definition. Given a first-order signature σ, an atomic IFG-formula is a pair 〈φ,X〉 where φ is
an atomic first-order formula and X is a finite set of variables that includes every variable that
appears in φ.
Definition. Given a first-order signature σ, the language L σIFG is the smallest set of formulas
such that:
1. Every atomic IFG-formula is in L σIFG.
2. If 〈φ, Y 〉 is in L σIFG and Y ⊆ X , then 〈φ,X〉 is in L
σ
IFG.
3. If 〈φ,X〉 is in L σIFG, then 〈∼φ,X〉 is in L
σ
IFG.
4. If 〈φ,X〉 and 〈ψ,X〉 are in L σIFG, and Y ⊆ X , then 〈φ ∨/Y ψ,X〉 is in L
σ
IFG.
5. If 〈φ,X〉 is in L σIFG, x ∈ X , and Y ⊆ X , then 〈∃x/Y φ,X〉 is in L
σ
IFG.
Above X and Y are finite sets of variables.
From now on we will make certain assumptions about IFG-formulas that will allow us to
simplify our notation. First, we will assume that the set of variables of L σIFG is { vn | n ∈ ω }.
Second, since it does not matter much which particular variables appear in a formula, we will
assume that variables with smaller indices are used before variables with larger indices. More
precisely, if 〈φ,X〉 is a formula, vj ∈ X , and i ≤ j, then vi ∈ X . By abuse of notation, if 〈φ,X〉
is a formula and |X | = N , then we will say that φ has N variables and write φ for 〈φ,X〉. As
a shorthand, we will call φ an IFGN -formula. Let L
σ
IFGN
= {φ ∈ L σIFG | φ has N variables}.
Third, sometimes we will write φ∨/J ψ instead of φ∨/Y ψ and ∃vn/Jφ instead of ∃vn/Y φ, where
J = { j | vj ∈ Y }. Finally, we will use φ ∧/J ψ to abbreviate ∼ (∼φ ∨/J ∼ψ) and ∀vn/Jφ to
abbreviate ∼∃vn/J ∼φ.
Definition. Let φ be an IFG-formula. The subformula tree of φ, denoted Sub(φ), is the smallest
tree satisfying the following conditions.
1. 〈∅, φ〉 ∈ Sub(φ).
2. If 〈s,∼ψ〉 ∈ Sub(φ), then 〈s⌢0, ψ〉 ∈ Sub(φ).
3. If 〈s, ψ1 ∨/J ψ2〉 ∈ Sub(φ), then 〈s
⌢1, ψ1〉 ∈ Sub(φ) and 〈s⌢2, ψ2〉 ∈ Sub(φ).
4. If 〈s, ∃vn/Jψ〉 ∈ Sub(φ), then 〈s
⌢3, ψ〉 ∈ Sub(φ).
For every 〈s, ψ〉 ∈ Sub(φ), 〈s, ψ〉 ∈ Sub+(φ) if s contains an even number of 0s, and 〈s, ψ〉 ∈
Sub−(φ) if s contains an odd number of 0s.
From now on, we will assume that all subformulas are indexed by their position in the
subformula tree. This will allow us to distinguish between multiple instances of the same formula
that may occur as subformulas of φ. For example, if φ is v0 = v1 ∨/v0 v0 = v1 we will distinguish
between the left and right disjuncts.
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1.2 Game semantics
Dechesne defines her semantic games in extensive form [6], which is standard practice in game
theory. It turns out that games in extensive form are more general than is necessary for our
purposes. We modify her definition in order to focus on those aspects of the games that are
relevant to the present discussion.
Definition. Given a first-order signature σ and a formula 〈φ,X〉 ∈ L σIFG, a structure A is called
suitable for φ if A has an interpretation for every non-logical symbol in σ.
Definition. If 〈φ,X〉 is a formula and A is a suitable structure, then a valuation for 〈φ,X〉 over
A is a function from X to A. Since we are assuming that X has the form {v0, . . . , vN−1}, we
will identify valuations with sequences of individuals in A, denoted ~a ∈ NA. A set of valuations
V ⊆ NA is called a team.
Definition. Let ~a,~b ∈ NA be two valuations, and let J ⊆ N . We say that ~a and ~b agree outside
of J , denoted ~a ≈J ~b, if ~a↾(N \ J) = ~b↾(N \ J).
Note that ≈J is an equivalence relation on NA. Also note that ≈∅ is the identity relation
and ≈N is the total relation on NA.
Lemma 1.1. Let ~a,~b ∈ NA, and let J ⊆ K ⊆ N . Then ~a ≈J ~b implies ~a ≈K ~b.
Proof. If ~a ≈J ~b, then ~a ↾ (N \ J) = ~b ↾ (N \ J), which implies ~a ↾ (N \K) = ~b ↾ (N \K). Hence
~a ≈K ~b.
Definition. If ~a ∈ NA, b ∈ A, and n < N , define ~a(n : b) to be the valuation that is like ~a
except that vn is assigned the value b instead of an. In other words,
~a(n : b) = ~a↾(N \ {n}) ∪ {〈n, b〉}.
We call ~a(n : b) an n-variant of ~a.
Definition. If V ⊆ NA is a team and b ∈ A, define
V (n : b) = {~a(n : b) | ~a ∈ V }.
Furthermore, if B ⊆ A define
V (n : B) = {~a(n : b) | ~a ∈ V, b ∈ B }.
A set V ′ ⊆ V (n : A) is called an n-variation of V if for every ~a ∈ V there is at least one n-variant
of ~a in V ′. Finally if f : V → A, and V ′ ⊆ V , define the n-variation of V ′ by f to be
V ′(n : f) = {~a(n : f(~a)) | ~a ∈ V ′ }.
Definition. Let φ be a formula with N variables, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ NA
be a team. The semantic game G(A, φ, V ) is defined as follows. A position of the game is a triple
〈ψ,~b, ε〉, where ψ is a subformula of φ, ~b ∈ NA, and ε ∈ {0, 1}. A terminal position is a position
in which ψ is an atomic formula. A play of the game is a sequence of positions 〈p0, . . . , pq〉 that
satisfies the following conditions.
1. The initial position p0 = 〈φ,~a, 1〉, where ~a ∈ V .
2. If pk = 〈∼ψ,~b, ε〉, then pk+1 = 〈ψ,~b, 1− ε〉.
3. If pk = 〈ψ1 ∨/J ψ2, ~b, ε〉, then pk+1 = 〈ψ1,~b, ε〉 or pk+1 = 〈ψ2,~b, ε〉.
4. If pk = 〈∃vn/Jψ, ~b, ε〉, then pk+1 = 〈ψ, ~b(n : c), ε〉 for some c ∈ A.
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5. The final position pq is a terminal position, and pq is the only terminal position in the
play.
A partial play 〈p0, . . . , pℓ〉 is an initial segment of a play. A partial play that is not a play is
called a proper partial play.
For a given play of the game with final position pq = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 where ψ is an atomic formula,
player ε wins if A |= ψ[~b], and player 1− ε wins if A 6|= ψ[~b]. In a given position 〈ψ,~b, ε〉, player
ε is called the verifier and player 1− ε is called the falsifier . The game G(A, φ, V ) is the set of
all possible plays. We will use G(A, φ) to abbreviate G(A, φ,NA).
Definition. A strategy for player ε for the game G(A, φ, V ) is a function S from the set of all
non-terminal positions of the game in which player ε is the verifier to the set of all positions. A
strategy is legal if for every proper partial play 〈p0, . . . , pℓ〉 where player ε is the verifier in pℓ,
the sequence 〈p0, . . . , pℓ, pℓ+1〉 is a partial play, where pℓ+1 = S(pℓ), and
1. if pℓ = 〈ψ1 ∨/J ψ2, ~a, ε〉 and p
′
ℓ = 〈ψ1 ∨/J ψ2,
~b, ε〉, where ~a ≈J ~b, then S(pℓ) = S(p
′
ℓ);
2. if pℓ = 〈∃vn/Jψ, ~a, ε〉 and p
′
ℓ = 〈∃vn/Jψ,
~b, ε〉, where ~a ≈J ~b, then S(pℓ) = S(p′ℓ).
Given a play p = 〈p0, . . . , pq〉 and a strategy S for player ε, player ε is said to follow S in p if
for every non-terminal position pk in which player ε is the verifier, pk+l = S(pk). A strategy for
player ε is winning if it is legal and player ε wins every play in which he or she follows S.
Observe that if V is empty the game G(A, φ, V ) has no positions nor plays. Hence the empty
strategy ∅ : ∅ → ∅ is a winning strategy for both players. As we will see later when we define a
Tarski-style satisfaction relation for IFG-formulas, this apparent defect is actually a feature.
Definition. We say that φ is true in A relative to V if player 1 has a winning strategy for
the semantic game G(A, φ, V ), and that φ is false in A relative to V if player 0 has a winning
strategy for G(A, φ, V ). In the first case, we call V a winning team (or trump) for φ in A. In
the second case, we call V a losing team (or cotrump) for φ in A. We say that φ is true in A if
it is true in A relative to NA, and that φ is false in A if it is false relative to NA.
Thus φ is true in A if and only if player 1 has a winning strategy for the game G(A, φ),
and φ is false in A if and only if player 0 has a winning strategy for G(A, φ). It is important
to realize that restricting the information available to the players at different moves does not
change the set of possible plays of the game G(A, φ, V ). It only restricts the strategies the
players are allowed to use.
Definition. Let pk = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 be a position of the game G(A, φ, V ). The dual position of pk
is p˜k = 〈ψ,~b, 1 − ε〉. If S1 is a strategy for player 1 for G(A, φ, V ), the dual strategy S˜1 for
player 0 for G(A,∼φ, V ) is defined by S˜1(p˜k) = S1(pk) for all pk ∈ dom(S1). If S0 is a strategy
for player 0 for G(A, φ, V ), the dual strategy S˜0 for player 1 for G(A,∼ φ, V ) is defined by
S˜0(〈∼φ,~a, 1〉) = S0(〈φ,~a, 0〉) for all ~a ∈ V , and S˜0(p˜k) = S0(pk) for all pk ∈ dom(S0).
Lemma 1.2. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ NA. Then S
is a winning strategy for player ε for the game G(A, φ, V ) if and only if S˜ is a winning strategy
for player 1− ε for G(A,∼φ, V ).
Proof. Suppose S1 is a winning strategy for player 1 for G(A, φ, V ). Then S˜1 is a legal strategy
for player 0 for G(A,∼φ, V ). To show that S˜1 is a winning strategy, let p˜ = 〈p˜0, p˜1, . . . , p˜q〉
be a play of G(A,∼φ, V ) in which player 0 follows S˜1, and let p˜q = 〈ψ,~b, 1 − ε〉. Then the
corresponding play p = 〈p1, . . . , pq〉 of G(A, φ, V ) is a play in which player 1 follows S1 and
pq = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉. By hypothesis, player 1 wins p. Hence A |= ψ[~b] if ε = 1 and A 6|= ψ[~b] if ε = 0.
Thus A |= ψ[~b] if 1− ε = 0 and A 6|= ψ[~b] if 1− ε = 1. In either case, player 0 wins p˜.
Conversely, suppose S˜1 is a winning strategy for player 0 for G(A,∼φ, V ). Then S1 is a
legal strategy for player 1 for G(A, ψ, V ). To show S1 is a winning strategy, let p = 〈p1, . . . , pq〉
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be a play of G(A, ψ, V ) in which player 1 follows S1, where p1 = 〈φ,~a, 1〉 and pq = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉.
Then p˜ = 〈p˜0, p˜1, . . . , p˜q〉 is a play of G(A, φ, V ), where p˜0 = 〈∼φ,~a, 1〉 and p˜q = 〈ψ,~b, 1 − ε〉.
By hypothesis, player 0 wins p˜. Hence A |= ψ[~b] if 1 − ε = 0 and A 6|= ψ[~b] if 1 − ε = 1. Thus
A |= ψ[~b] if ε = 1 and A 6|= ψ[~b] if ε = 0. In either case, player 1 wins.
Similarly, S0 is a winning strategy for player 0 for G(A, φ, V ) if and only if S˜0 is a winning
strategy for player 1 for G(A,∼φ, V ).
Proposition 1.3. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ NA.
Then φ is true in A relative to V if and only if ∼φ is false in A relative to V , and vice versa.
Proof. By the previous lemma, Elo¨ıse has a winning strategy forG(A, φ, V ) if and only if Abe´lard
has a winning strategy for G(A,∼φ, V ), and Elo¨ıse has a winning strategy for G(A,∼ φ, V ) if
and only if Abe´lard has a winning strategy for G(A, φ, V ).
Proposition 1.4. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ NA.
Then φ is true in A relative to V if and only if ∼(∼φ) is true in A relative to V .
Proof. By Proposition 1.3, φ is true in A relative to V if and only if ∼φ is false in A relative to
V if and only if ∼(∼φ) is true in A relative to V .
Proposition 1.5. Let φ be an IFGN -sentence. If φ is true in A relative to some nonempty
V ⊆ NA, then φ is true in A.
Proof. Suppose S is a winning strategy for Elo¨ıse for G(A, φ, V ). We will construct a winning
strategy for Elo¨ıse for G(A, φ,NA). To do so, we will need to keep track of which variables the
players have had the opportunity to modify during the play of the game. For each subformula
ψ of φ, define a set of indices Jψ of those variables of ψ that have been unbound:
1. Jφ = ∅.
2. If ψ is a subformula of φ of the form ∼χ, then Jχ = Jψ.
3. If ψ is a subformula of φ of the form χ1 ∨/K χ2, then Jχ1 = Jψ and Jχ2 = Jψ.
4. If ψ is a subformula of φ of the form ∃vn/Kχ, then Jχ = Jψ ∪ {n}.
Fix ~a ∈ V . For every position p = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 of G(A, φ,NA) define
f(p) = (~a↾N \ Jψ) ∪ (~b↾Jψ)
and F (p) = 〈ψ, f(p), ε〉. Observe that F (p) is a position of G(A, φ, V ). Define a strategy T for
Elo¨ıse for G(A, φ,NA) as follows:
1. If p = 〈∼χ,~b, ε〉, then T (p) = 〈χ,~b, 1− ε〉.
2. If p = 〈χ1 ∨/K χ2,~b, ε〉 and S(F (p)) = 〈χi, f(p), ε〉, then T (p) = 〈χi,~b, ε〉.
3. If p = 〈∃vn/Kχ,~b, ε〉 and S(F (p)) = 〈χ, f(p)(n : c), ε〉, then T (p) = 〈χ,~b(n : c), ε〉.
To show that T is a legal strategy, it suffices to observe that if p = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 and p′ = 〈ψ,~b′, ε〉,
where ~b ≈K ~b′, then
f(p) = (~a↾N \ Jψ) ∪ (~b ↾Jψ) ≈K (~a↾N \ Jψ) ∪ (~b
′ ↾Jψ) = f(p
′).
Hence S(F (p)) = S(F (p′)) because S is a legal strategy. Thus T (p) = T (p′).
To show that T is a winning strategy, let 〈p0, . . . , pq〉 be a play of G(A, φ,NA) in which
Elo¨ıse follows T . Then 〈F (p0), . . . , F (pq)〉 is a play of G(A, φ, V ) in which Elo¨ıse follows S. Let
pq = 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 and F (pq) = 〈ψ, f(pq), ε〉. Note that ~b and f(pq) agree on the free variables of
ψ because φ was a sentence. Thus A |= ψ[~b] if and only if A |= ψ[f(pq)] if and only if ε = 1
because S is a winning strategy for Elo¨ıse for G(A, φ, V ).
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Definition. A position 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 of the game G(A, φ, V ) is reachable if it occurs in some play of
G(A, φ, V ). Otherwise, it is unreachable.
For example, let φ be ∃v1(v0 = v1), and let A be the equality structure with universe {0, 1}.
Then 〈φ, 00, 0〉 and 〈v0 = v1, 10, 1〉 are both unreachable positions of the game G(A, φ, {00, 01}).
The position 〈φ, 00, 0〉 is unreachable because player 1 is always the initial verifier; the position
〈v0 = v1, 11, 1〉 is unreachable because in any play of the game the initial valuation is either 00
or 01, and the players never have the opportunity to modify v0.
Lemma 1.6. Let φ be an IFG-formula, and let 〈ψ,~b, ε〉 be a reachable position of the game
G(A, φ, V ). Then
(a) ψ ∈ Sub+(φ) if and only if ε = 1.
(b) ψ ∈ Sub−(φ) if and only if ε = 0.
Theorem 1.7. Let φ be a first-order formula with N variables. We can treat φ as an IFGN -
formula if we interpret ¬ as ∼, ∨ as ∨/∅ , and ∃vn as ∃vn/∅. If we do so, then for every suitable
structure A and team V ⊆ NA,
(a) φ is true in A relative to V if and only if A |= φ[~a] for all ~a ∈ V ,
(b) φ is false in A relative to V if and only if A 6|= φ[~a] for all ~a ∈ V .
Proof. By two simultaneous inductions on the complexity of φ. A full proof can be found in
[18].
Corollary 1.8. Let φ be a first-order sentence, and let A be a suitable structure. Then
(a) φ is true in A if and only if A |= φ,
(b) φ is false in A if and only if A 6|= φ.
1.3 Trump semantics
The main definition and theorem of this section are due to Hodges [14, 15]. See also related
work by Cameron and Hodges [4], Caicedo and Krynicki [3], Va¨a¨na¨nen [22], and Dechesne [6].
Definition. Given any set V , a cover of V is a collection of sets U such that V =
⋃
U . A
disjoint cover of V is a cover of V whose members are pairwise disjoint. A partition of V is a
disjoint cover of V whose members are all nonempty. Sometimes the members of a partition are
called cells .
Definition. Let V ⊆ NA be a team, J ⊆ N , and U a cover of V . Call the cover J-saturated if
every U ∈ U is closed under ≈J . That is, for every ~a,~b ∈ V , if ~a ≈J ~b and ~a ∈ U ∈ U , then
~b ∈ U .
Note that every member of a J-saturated cover of V is a union of equivalence classes under
≈J . Also note that every cover of V is ∅-saturated, and that the only N -saturated covers of V
are {V } and {∅, V }.
Definition. Define a partial operation
⋃
J on collections of sets of valuations by setting
⋃
J U =⋃
U whenever U is a J-saturated disjoint cover of
⋃
U and letting
⋃
J U be undefined other-
wise. Thus the formula V =
⋃
J U asserts that U is a J-saturated disjoint cover of V . We will
use the notation V1 ∪J V2 to abbreviate
⋃
J{V1, V2}, the notation V1 ∪J V2 ∪J V3 to abbreviate⋃
J{V1, V2, V3}, et cetera.
Lemma 1.9. Let V ⊆ NA and J ⊆ N . If U is a J-saturated cover of V , then there is a
J-saturated disjoint cover U ′ of V such that every cell in U ′ is contained in some cell in U .
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Proof. Let 〈Uα | α < µ 〉 be an enumeration of U . Define U ′α = Uα \
⋃
β<αUβ , and let
U ′ = {U ′α | α < µ }. By construction, U
′ is a disjoint cover of V such that U ′α ⊆ Uα. To
show U ′ is J-saturated, suppose ~a,~b ∈ V . If ~a ≈J ~b and ~a ∈ U ′α = Uα \
⋃
β<αUβ , then
~b ∈ Uα \
⋃
β<αUβ = U
′
α because U is J-saturated.
Lemma 1.10. Let V ⊆ NA and J ⊆ K ⊆ N . If V =
⋃
K U , then V =
⋃
J U .
Proof. Suppose V =
⋃
K U and ~a,
~b ∈ V . If ~a ≈J ~b and ~a ∈ U ∈ U , then ~a ≈K ~b, so ~b ∈ U .
Thus V =
⋃
J U .
Lemma 1.11. Let V ′ ⊆ V ⊆ NA. If V =
⋃
J U , then V
′ =
⋃
J U
′, where
U
′ = {U ∩ V ′ | U ∈ U }.
Proof. Suppose ~a,~b ∈ V ′. If ~a ≈J ~b, and ~a ∈ U ∩ V ′ ∈ U ′, then we have ~b ∈ U ∩ V ′ because
V =
⋃
J U .
Lemma 1.12. If V = V1 ∪J V2 and V1 =
⋃
J U1, V2 =
⋃
J U2, then V =
⋃
J (U1 ∪U2).
Proof. Suppose ~a,~b ∈ V , ~a ≈J ~b, and ~a ∈ U ∈ U1 ∪ U2. Without loss of generality, we may
assume U ∈ U1, which implies that ~a ∈ V1, in which case ~b ∈ V1 because V = V1 ∪J V2. Hence
~b ∈ U because V1 =
⋃
J U1.
Definition. Let V ⊆ NA and J ⊆ N . A function f : V → A is independent of J , denoted
f : V →
J
A, if f(~a) = f(~b) whenever ~a ≈J ~b.
Note that any function f : V → A is independent of ∅, and that f : V → A is independent
N if and only if f is a constant function.
Lemma 1.13. Let V ⊆ NA and J ⊆ K ⊆ N . If f : V →
K
A, then f : V →
J
A.
Proof. Suppose f : V →
K
A. If ~a ≈J ~b, then ~a ≈K ~b, so f(~a) = f(~b). Thus f : V →
J
A.
Lemma 1.14. Let V ⊆ NA and J ⊆ N . If V = V1 ∪J V2 and f : V1 →
J
A, g : V2 →
J
A, then
(f ∪ g) : V →
J
A.
Proof. Suppose ~a ≈J ~b. Then because V = V1∪JV2, either ~a,~b ∈ V1 or ~a,~b ∈ V2. In the first case,
(f∪g)(~a) = f(~a) = f(~b) = (f∪g)(~b), and in the second case, (f∪g)(~a) = g(~a) = g(~b) = (f∪g)(~b),
because f and g are both independent of J . Therefore (f ∪ g) is independent of J .
Lemma 1.15. If f : V →
J
A, V = V1∪K V2, and n ∈ K, then V (n : f) = V1(n : f)∪K V2(n : f).
Proof. Suppose f : V →
J
A, V = V1 ∪K V2, and n ∈ K. Then V1(n : f) and V2(n : f)
are both subsets of V (n : f), so V1(n : f) ∪ V2(n : f) ⊆ V (n : f). Conversely, suppose
~a(n : f(~a)) ∈ V (n : f), where ~a ∈ V . If ~a ∈ V1, then ~a(n : f(~a)) ∈ V1(n : f), and if
~a ∈ V2, then ~a(n : f(~a)) ∈ V2(n : f). Hence ~a(n : f(~a)) ∈ V1(n : f) ∪ V2(n : f). Thus
V (n : f) ⊆ V1(n : f) ∪ V2(n : f).
To show V1(n : f) and V2(n : f) are disjoint, suppose ~a(n : f(~a)) ∈ V1(n : f) and ~b(n :
f(~b)) ∈ V2(n : f), where ~a ∈ V1 and ~b ∈ V2. If ~a(n : f(~a)) = ~b(n : f(~b)), then ~a ≈{n} ~b, hence
~a ≈K ~b because n ∈ K, contradicting V = V1 ∪K V2.
Finally suppose ~a(n : f(~a)) ≈K ~b(n : f(~b)) and ~a(n : f(~a)) ∈ Vi(n : f), where ~a ∈ Vi. Then
~a ≈K ~b because n ∈ K. Hence ~b ∈ Vi. Thus ~b(n : f(~b)) ∈ Vi(n : f(~b)).
Lemma 1.16. Suppose f : V →
J
A and g : V (n : f)→
K
A. Then there is a function h : V −→
J∩K
A
such that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h). If n ∈ K, then h is independent of K.
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Proof. Define h : V → A by h(~a) = g(~a(n : f(~a))). To show that h is independent of J ∩ K,
suppose ~a ≈J∩K ~b. Then ~a ≈J ~b, so f(~a) = f(~b). Hence
~a(n : f(~a)) ≈J∩K ~b(n : f(~b)),
which implies ~a(n : f(~a)) ≈K ~b(n : f(~b)). Thus
h(~a) = g(~a(n : f(~a))) = g(~b(n : f(~b))) = h(~b).
Now suppose n ∈ K and ~a ≈K ~b. Then ~a(n : f(~a)) ≈K ~b(n : f(~b)), so
h(~a) = g(~a(n : f(~a))) = g(~b(n : f(~b))) = h(~b).
Let f (n) : V → V (n : f) be the function that maps ~a to ~a(n : f(~a)). Let g(n) and h(n) be
defined similarly. Then h(n) = g(n) ◦ f (n) and
V (n : h) = h(n)(V ) = g(n) ◦ f (n)(V ) = g(n)(f (n)(V )) = V (n : f)(n : g).
Lemma 1.17. Given two functions f : V →
J
A and h : V →
K
A, with n ∈ K, there is a function
g : V (n : f)→
K
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h).
Proof. Define g : V (n : f) →
K
A by g(~a(n : f(~a)) = h(~a). To show that g is well defined and
independent of K, suppose ~a,~b ∈ V and ~a(n : f(~a)) ≈K ~b(n : f(~b)). Then ~a ≈K ~b because
n ∈ K. Hence g(~a(n : f(~a)) = h(~a) = h(~b) = g(~b(n : f(~b)). By construction h(n) = g(n) ◦ f (n),
so V (n : h) = V (n : f)(n : g).
Lemma 1.18. Suppose f : V →
J
A and g : V (m : f)→
K
A. If m ∈ K and n ∈ J , where m 6= n,
then there exist functions G : V →
K
A and F : V (n : G) →
J
A such that V (m : f)(n : g) = V (n :
G)(m : F ).
Proof. Define G : V →
K
A by G(~a) = g(~a(m : f(~a))) and F : V (n : G)→
J
A by F (~a(n : G(~a))) =
f(~a). Observe that G is independent of K because m ∈ K and g is independent of K. Also
observe that F is well defined and independent of J because n ∈ J and f is independent of J .
To show V (m : f)(n : g) = V (n : G)(m : F ) it suffices to show that g(n)◦f (m) = F (m)◦G(n).
So let ~a ∈ V . Then
g(n) ◦ f (m)(~a) = ~a(m : f(~a))(n : g(~a(m : f(~a))))
= ~a(m : f(~a))(n : G(~a))
= ~a(n : G(~a))(m : F (~a(n : G(~a))))
= F (m) ◦G(n)(~a).
Lemma 1.19. Suppose n ∈ J .
(a) If V = V1 ∪J V2, then V (n : A) = V1(n : A) ∪J V2(n : A).
(b) If V (n : A) = V1 ∪J V2, then V1 = V1(n : A) and V2 = V2(n : A).
Proof. (a) Suppose V = V1 ∪J V2. If ~a(n : c) ∈ V (n : A), then either ~a ∈ V1 or ~a ∈ V2.
In the first case ~a(n : c) ∈ V1(n : A), and in the second case ~a(n : c) ∈ V2(n : A). Hence
V (n : A) = V1(n : A) ∪ V2(n : A). To show J-saturation, suppose ~a,~b ∈ V , ~a(n : c) ≈J ~b(n : d),
and ~a(n : c) ∈ Vi(n : A). Then ~a ≈J ~b because n ∈ J , and ~a ∈ Vi, so ~b ∈ Vi. Hence ~b(n : d) ∈
Vi(n : A). To show V1(n : A) and V2(n : A) are disjoint, suppose ~c ∈ V1(n : A) ∩ V2(n : A).
Then there exist ~a ∈ V1, ~b ∈ V2, and d ∈ A such that ~a(n : d) = ~c = ~b(n : d). But then ~a ≈J ~b,
which implies ~a,~b ∈ V1 ∩ V2, contradicting the fact that V1 and V2 are disjoint.
(b) Suppose V (n : A) = V1 ∪J V2. By definition, Vi ⊆ Vi(n : A). If ~a(n : c) ∈ Vi(n : A), then
~a ≈J ~a(n : c) and ~a ∈ Vi, so ~a(n : c) ∈ Vi. Hence Vi(n : A) ⊆ Vi.
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We now define an Tarski-style satisfaction relation for IFG-formulas.
Definition. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ NA.
• If φ is atomic, then
(+) A |=+ φ[V ] if and only if for every ~a ∈ V , A |= φ[~a],
(−) A |=− φ[V ] if and only if for every ~a ∈ V , A 6|= φ[~a].
• If φ is ∼ψ, then
(+) A |=+ ∼ψ[V ] if and only if A |=− ψ[V ],
(−) A |=− ∼ψ[V ] if and only if A |=+ ψ[V ].
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ψ1 ∨/J ψ2, then
(+) A |=+ ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V ] if and only if there is a J-saturated disjoint cover V = V1 ∪J V2
such that A |=+ ψ1[V1] and A |=
+ ψ2[V2],
(−) A |=− ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V ] if and only if A |=
− ψ1[V ] and A |=− ψ2[V ].
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ∃vn/Jψ, then
(+) A |=+ ∃vn/Jψ[V ] if and only if there is a function f : V →
J
A independent of J such
that A |=+ ψ[V (n : f)],
(−) A |=− ∃vn/Jψ[V ] if and only if A |=
− ψ[V (n : A)].
It is easy to check that the abbreviations ∧/J and ∀vn/J behave as expected.
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ψ1 ∧/J ψ2, then
(+) A |=+ ψ1 ∧/J ψ2[V ] if and only if A |=
+ ψ1[V ] and A |=+ ψ2[V ],
(−) A |=− ψ1 ∧/J ψ2[V ] if and only if there is a J-saturated disjoint cover V = V1 ∪J V2
such that A |=− ψ1[V1] and A |=− ψ2[V2].
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ∀vn/Jψ, then
(+) A |=+ ∀vn/Jψ[V ] if and only if A |=
+ ψ[V (n : A)],
(−) A |=− ∀vn/Jψ[V ] if and only if there is a function f : V →
J
A independent of J such
that A |=− ψ[V (n : f)].
Definition. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, and let A be a suitable structure. Define A |=± φ if
and only if A |=± φ[NA].
Lemma 1.20. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, and let A be a suitable structure. Then A |=± φ[∅].
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ. If φ is atomic the lemma holds vacuously.
Suppose φ is ∼ψ. Then A |=± ∼ψ[∅] if and only if A |=∓ ψ[∅], which holds by inductive
hypothesis.
Suppose J ⊆ N and φ is ψ1 ∨/J ψ2. By inductive hypothesis, A |=
± ψ1[∅] and A |=± ψ2[∅].
Therefore A |=± ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[∅].
Suppose J ⊆ N and φ is ∃vn/Jψ. By inductive hypothesis, A |=
± ψ[∅]. Let f be the empty
function from ∅ to A. Then f is vacuously independent of J and ∅(n : f) = ∅. Therefore
A |=+ ∃vn/Jψ[∅]. Also ∅(n : A) = ∅, so A |=
− ∃vn/Jψ[∅].
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The previous result may seems anomalous, but it is necessary for technical reasons. Specifi-
cally, in the positive disjunction clause we wish to allow V1 = V and V2 = ∅ or vice versa, which
corresponds to the situation in the game G(A, φ, V ) when the verifier always wishes to choose
the same disjunct. Later we will see that the empty team is the only team that can be winning
and losing for the same formula.
The next lemma records the fact that if a player has a winning strategy, given that he or
she knows the current valuation belongs to V , then that strategy should win given that he or
she knows the current valuation belongs to a subset of V .
Lemma 1.21. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V
′ ⊆ V ⊆ NA.
Then A |=± φ[V ] implies A |=± φ[V ′].
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ. The atomic case follows immediately
from the definition.
Suppose φ is ∼ψ. Then A |=± ∼ψ[V ] if and only if A |=∓ ψ[V ], which by inductive
hypothesis implies A |=∓ ψ[V ′], which holds if and only if A |=± ∼ψ[V ′].
Suppose J ⊆ N and φ is ψ1 ∨/J ψ2. If A |=
+ ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V ], then there is a J-saturated
disjoint cover V = V1 ∪J V2 such that A |=+ ψ1[V1] and A |=+ ψ2[V2]. Let V ′1 = V1 ∩ V
′ and
V ′2 = V2 ∩ V
′. Then by Lemma 1.11, V ′ = V ′1 ∪J V
′
2 is a J-saturated disjoint cover, and by
inductive hypothesis A |=+ ψ1[V ′1 ] and A |=
+ ψ2[V
′
2 ]. Thus A |=
+ ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V
′].
If A |=− ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V ], then A |=
− ψ1[V ] and A |=− ψ2[V ]. By inductive hypothesis,
A |=− ψ1[V ′] and A |=− ψ2[V ′]. Thus A |=− ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V
′].
Suppose J ⊆ N and φ is ∃vn/Jψ. If A |=
+ ∃vn/Jψ[V ], then there is a function f : V →
J
A
independent of J such that A |=+ ψ[V (n : f)]. The restriction of f to V ′ is independent of J ,
and by inductive hypothesis A |=+ ψ[V ′(n : f)]. Thus A |=+ ∃vn/Jψ[V
′].
If A |=− ∃vn/Jψ[V ], then A |=
− ψ[V (n : A)]. By inductive hypothesis we have A |=−
ψ[V ′(n : A)]. Thus A |=− ∃vn/Jψ[V
′].
Next we show that a given team cannot be winning and losing for the same formula, which
reflects the fact that Abe´lard and Elo¨ıse cannot both have winning strategies for the same
semantic game.
Lemma 1.22. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, and let A be a suitable structure. If V ⊆
NA is a
nonempty team, then we cannot have
A |=+ φ[V ] and A |=− φ[V ].
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ. Suppose A |=+ φ[V ]. If φ is atomic,
then because V is nonempty there is an ~a ∈ V such that A |= φ[~a]. Hence A 6|=− φ[V ].
Suppose φ is ∼ψ. Then A |=− ψ[V ], so by inductive hypothesis A 6|=+ ψ[V ]. Hence
A 6|=− ∼ψ[V ].
Suppose J ⊆ N and φ is ψ1 ∨/J ψ2. Then there is a J-saturated disjoint cover V =
V1 ∪J V2 such that A |=+ ψ1[V1] and A |=+ ψ2[V2]. By inductive hypothesis, A 6|=− ψ1[V1]
and A 6|=− ψ2[V2]. It follows from Lemma 1.21 that A 6|=− ψ1[V ] and A 6|=− ψ2[V ]. Hence
A 6|=− ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[V ].
Suppose n < N , J ⊆ N , and φ is ∃vn/Jψ. Then there is an f : V →
J
A such that A |=+
ψ[V (n : f)]. By inductive hypothesis, A 6|=− ψ[V (n : f)]. It follows from Lemma 1.21 that
A 6|=− ψ[V (n : A)]. Hence A 6|=− ∃vn/Jψ[V ].
The main result of this section is that trump semantics and game semantics are equivalent.
This is significant because of Hintikka’s claim in The Principles of Mathematics Revisited that
independence-friendly logic does not have a compositional semantics.
Theorem 1.23. Let φ be an IFGN -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ NA.
Then
(a) A |=+ φ[V ] if and only if φ is true in A relative to V ;
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(b) A |=− φ[V ] if and only if φ is false in A relative to V .
Proof. By two simultaneous inductions on the complexity of φ. A full proof can be found in
[18].
Corollary 1.24. (a) A |=+ φ if and only if φ is true in A.
(b) A |=− φ if and only if φ is false in A.
The next two results show that IFG-formulas that differ only in their number of variables
have essentially the same meaning, as long as we do not encode any information in the extra
variables. The phenomenon of one player using extra variables to send (otherwise forbidden)
information to him or herself is called signaling. For example, let φ be the formula
v0 = v1 ∨/{0,1} v0 6= v1,
and let A be the equality structure over {0, 1}. If V = {00, 01, 10, 11}, then Elo¨ıse does not
have a winning strategy for G(A, φ, V ). However, if φ′ is the 3-variable version of φ, and
V ′ = {001, 010, 100, 111}, then Elo¨ıse does have a winning strategy for G(A, φ′, V ′) because she
can use the value of v2 to signal whether the values of v0 and v1 are equal.
Lemma 1.25. Let φ be an IFG-formula with M variables, and let φ′ be the same formula but
with N variables, where M < N . Let A be a suitable structure, V ⊆ NA, ∅ 6= W ⊆ N\MA, and
V ′ = {~a ∪~b | ~a ∈ V, ~b ∈W }. Then A |=± φ[V ] if and only if A |=± φ′[V ′].
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. A full proof can be found in [18].
Corollary 1.26. Let φ be an IFG-formula with M variables, let φ′ be the same formula but
with N variables, where M < N , and let A be a suitable structure. Then A |=± φ if and only if
A |=± φ′.
Proof. By Lemma 1.25, A |=± φ if and only if A |=± φ[MA] if and only if A |=± φ′[NA] if and
only if A |=± φ′.
Henceforth, we will use the same symbol for formulas that differ only in the number of
variables they have. For example, we will write φ[V ′] instead of φ′[V ′].
2 Independence-Friendly Cylindric Set Algebras
Definition. An independence-friendly cylindric power set algebra is an algebra whose universe
is P(P(NA)) ×P(P(NA)), where A is a set and N is a natural number. The set A is called
the base set , and the number N is called the dimension of the algebra. Since each element X
is an ordered pair, we will use the notation X+ to refer to the first coordinate of the pair, and
X− to refer to the second coordinate. There are a finite number of operations:
• the constant 0 = 〈{∅},P(NA)〉;
• the constant 1 = 〈P(NA), {∅}〉;
• for all i, j < N , the constant Dij is defined by
(+) D+ij = P({~a ∈
NA | ai = aj }),
(−) D−ij = P({~a ∈
NA | ai 6= aj });
• if X = 〈X+, X−〉, then X∪ = 〈X−, X+〉;
• for every J ⊆ N , the binary operation +J is defined by
(+) V ∈ (X +J Y )+ if and only if V = V1 ∪J V2 for some V1 ∈ X+ and V2 ∈ Y +,
12
(−) (X +J Y )− = X− ∩ Y −;
• for every J ⊆ N , the binary operation ·J is defined by
(+) (X ·J Y )+ = X+ ∩ Y +,
(−) W ∈ (X ·J Y )− if and only if W =W1 ∪J W2 for some W1 ∈ X− and W2 ∈ Y −;
• for every n < N and J ⊆ N , the unary operation Cn,J is defined by
(+) V ∈ Cn,J(X)+ if and only if V (n : f) ∈ X+ for some f : V →
J
A,
(−) W ∈ Cn,J(X)− if and only if W (n : A) ∈ X−.
Definition. An independence-friendly cylindric set algebra (or IFG-algebra, for short) is any
subalgebra of an independence-friendly cylindric power set algebra. An IFGN -cylindric set
algebra (or IFGN -algebra) is an independence-friendly cylindric set algebra of dimension N .
We will use the notation X =+ Y to abbreviate X+ = Y + and X =− Y to abbreviate
X− = Y −. Furthermore, X ≤+ Y abbreviates X+ ⊆ Y +, and X ≤− Y abbreviates X− ⊆ Y −.
Define X ≤ Y if and only if X ≤+ Y and Y ≤− X . It follows immediately from the definitions
that X ≤± Y if and only if X∪ ≤∓ Y ∪. Hence, X ≤ Y if and only if Y ∪ ≤ X∪.
2.1 Duality
We include the operations ·J in the signature of independence-friendly cylindric set algebras for
the sake of compatibility with De Morgan algebra. We could have omitted ·J from the definition
and instead defined it in terms of +J and
∪.
Lemma 2.1. X ·J Y = (X∪ +J Y ∪)∪.
Proof. It follows immediately from the definition that (X∪)∪ = X and (X∪)± = X∓. Hence
(X ·J Y )
+ = X+ ∩ Y +
= (X∪)− ∩ (Y ∪)−
= (X∪ +J Y
∪)−
= ((X∪ +J Y
∪)∪)+.
Also W ∈ (X ·J Y )− if and only if W = W1 ∪J W2 for some W1 ∈ X− = (X∪)+ and
W2 ∈ Y − = (Y ∪)+ if and only if W ∈ (X∪ +J Y ∪)+ = ((X∪ +J Y ∪)∪)−.
The cylindrifications Cn,J also have their corresponding dual operations, defined by
C∂n,J (X) = Cn,J (X
∪)∪.
We do not include the dual cylindrifications in the signature of IFGN -cylindric set algebras for
the sake of compatibility with cylindric algebra.
Every IFGN -cylindric set algebra
C = 〈U ; 0, 1, Dij ,
∪, +J , ·J , Cn,J〉
has a dual algebra
C
∂ = 〈U ; 1, 0, D∪ij ,
∪, ·J , +J , C
∂
n,J〉.
Furthermore, the operation ∪ is an isomorphism from C to C∂ . Therefore any algebraic statement
about independence-friendly cylindric set algebras can be dualized by systematically exchanging
the symbols 0 with 1, Dij with D
∪
ij , +J with ·J , and Cn,J with C
∂
n,J . Statements involving the
superscripts + and − can be dualized by their exchange, even though the symbols + and − do
not belong to the signature. In particular, the dual of ≤ is ≥. Henceforth we will often state a
theorem and its dual together, but we will not prove the dual.
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2.2 Fixed points
An element X of an IFG-algebra is a fixed point if X∪ = X . ClearlyX is a fixed point if and only
if X+ = X−. Two fixed points in particular deserve special mention. In a given IFGN -algebra,
let Ω = 〈{∅}, {∅}〉 and ℧ = 〈P(NA),P(NA)〉. Neither the symbol Ω nor the symbol ℧ belong
to the signature of IFG-algebras. However, we will see that Ω is definable in most IFG-algebras,
and it is often present even when it is not definable.
Lemma 2.2. In any IFGN -algebra C, if there exists an element X ∈ C such that X+∩X− = {∅}
and NA /∈ X+ ∪X−, then Ω ∈ C.
Proof. Suppose X is such an element, and consider C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X ·N X
∪). Observe that
V ∈ C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X ·N X
∪)+ if and only if the exist functions f0, . . . , fN−1 such that V (0 :
f0) . . . (N − 1 : fN−1) ∈ (X ·N X∪)+ = X+ ∩ X− = {∅} if and only if V = ∅. Also, W ∈
C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X ·N X
∪)− if and only if W (0 : A) . . . (N − 1 : A) ∈ (X ·N X∪)−. Note that if
W = ∅ then W (0 : A) . . . (N − 1 : A) = ∅, and if W 6= ∅ then W (0 : A) . . . (N − 1 : A) = NA.
Also note that ∅ ∈ (X ·N X
∪)− because ∅ ∈ X+ ∩ X−, while NA /∈ (X ·N X
∪)− because if it
did we would have NA ∈ X+ or NA ∈ X−. Thus W ∈ CN−1,∅ . . . C0,∅(X ·N X
∪)− if and only if
W = ∅.
In any IFG-algebra of dimension at least two and whose base set has at least two elements
we have D+01 ∩D
−
01 = ∅ and
NA /∈ D+01 ∪D
−
01. Hence
C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(D01 ·N D
∪
01) = Ω.
In the next section we will show that if |A| = 1 or N = 1 then there are examples of IFG-algebras
that do not include Ω.
2.3 CsIFGN (A)
The motivating examples of IFG-algebras are those whose elements are the meanings of IFG-
formulas.
Definition. Given a structure A and an IFGN -formula φ, define
‖φ‖+
A
= {V ⊆ NA | A |=+ φ[V ] },
‖φ‖−
A
= {W ⊆ NA | A |=− φ[W ] },
‖φ‖
A
= 〈‖φ‖+
A
, ‖φ‖−
A
〉.
By Theorem 1.23, ‖φ‖+
A
is the set of all winning teams for φ in A, and ‖φ‖−
A
is the set of all
losing teams. We will call ‖φ‖
A
the meaning of φ in A. If the structure is clear from context we
will omit the subscript and simply write ‖φ‖+, ‖φ‖−, and ‖φ‖.
Definition. Given an σ-structure A, the IFGN -algebra over A, denoted CsIFGN (A), is the
IFGN -algebra whose universe is the set { ‖φ‖A | φ ∈ L
σ
IFGN
}. Observe that if X = ‖φ‖ and
Y = ‖ψ‖, then
0 = ‖v0 6= v0‖ ,
1 = ‖v0 = v0‖ ,
Dij = ‖vi = vj‖ ,
X∪ = ‖∼φ‖ ,
X +J Y =
∥∥φ ∨/J ψ∥∥ ,
X ·J Y =
∥∥φ ∧/J ψ∥∥ ,
Cn,J (X) =
∥∥∃vn/Jφ∥∥ .
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Lemma 2.3. For any formula φ and suitable structure A we have
‖φ‖+
A
∩ ‖φ‖−
A
= {∅}.
Proof. By Lemma 1.20 and Lemma 1.22.
Lemma 2.4. For any formula φ and suitable structure A, if V ′ ⊆ V ∈ ‖φ‖±
A
, then V ′ ∈ ‖φ‖±
A
.
Proof. By Lemma 1.21.
In ordinary first-order logic a sentence can have one of only two possible truth-values: true
or false. Thus if φ is a sentence either φA = 0 or φA = 1. In IFG logic a sentence φ may be
neither true nor false, so ‖φ‖
A
can take values other than 0 or 1. Interestingly, the only other
possible value is Ω.
Proposition 2.5. If φ is an IFGN -sentence and A is a suitable structure, then ‖φ‖A ∈ {0,Ω, 1}.
Proof. If ‖φ‖
A
6= Ω, then there is a nonempty V ⊆ NA such that V ∈ ‖φ‖+
A
or V ∈ ‖φ‖−
A
. By
Proposition 1.5, in the first case ‖φ‖
A
= 1, and in the second case ‖φ‖
A
= 0.
Lemma 2.6. If |A| = 1, then for every IFGN -formula φ, either A |=+ φ or A |=− φ.
Proof. If |A| = 1, then
∣∣NA∣∣ = 1. Let NA = {~a}.
Suppose φ is atomic. Then either A |= φ[~a] or A 6|= φ[~a]. In the first case A |=+ φ[{~a}], and
in the second case A |=− φ[{~a}].
Suppose φ is ∼ ψ. Then by inductive hypothesis A |=+ ψ[{~a}] or A |=− ψ[{~a}], in which
case A |=−∼ψ[{~a}] or A |=+∼ψ[{~a}].
Suppose φ is ψ1 ∨/J ψ2. If A |=
+ ψ1[{~a}], then A |=
+ ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[{~a}] because {~a} = {~a}∪J ∅
and it is always the case that A |=+ ψ2[∅]. Similarly, if A |=+ ψ2[{~a}], then A |=+ ψ1∨/J ψ2[{~a}].
If A |=− ψ1[{~a}] and A |=− ψ2[{~a}], then A |=− ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[{~a}].
Suppose φ is ∃vn/Jψ. If A |=
+ ψ[{~a}], let f : {~a} →
J
A be the function that sends ~a to a0.
Then {~a}(n : f) = {~a}, so A |=+ ψ[{~a}(n : f)]. Hence A |=+ ∃vn/Jψ[{~a}]. If |=
− ψ[{~a}], then
{~a}(n : A) = {~a}, so A |=− ψ[{~a}(n : A)]. Hence A |=− ∃vn/Jψ[{~a}].
Thus if |A| = 1, CsIFGN (A) is essentially the same structure as the two-element Boolean
algebra.
Lemma 2.7. Let A be a structure. The element Ω ∈ CsIFGN (A) if and only if there is an atomic
IFGN -formula φ such that A 6|=+ φ and A 6|=− φ.
Proof. Suppose A 6|=+ φ[NA] and A 6|=− φ[NA]. Then ‖φ‖+
A
∩ ‖φ‖−
A
= {∅} by Lemma 2.3, and
NA /∈ ‖φ‖+
A
∪ ‖φ‖−
A
by hypothesis. Hence Ω ∈ CsIFGN (A) by Lemma 2.2. Conversely, suppose
that for every atomic IFGN -formula, either A |=+ φ[NA] or A |=− φ[NA]. We wish to show that
for every IFGN -formula, either A |=+ φ[NA] or A |=− φ[NA].
Suppose φ is ∼ψ. By inductive hypothesis, either A |=+ ψ[NA] or A |=− ψ[NA]. In the first
case A |=−∼ψ[NA], and in the second case A |=+∼ψ[NA].
Suppose φ is ψ1 ∨/J ψ2. Then by inductive hypothesis A |=
± ψ1[
NA] and A |=± ψ2[
NA]. If
A |=+ ψ1[NA] or A |=+ ψ2[NA], then A |=+ ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[
NA]. If A |=− ψ1[NA] and A |=− ψ2[NA],
then A |=− ψ1 ∨/J ψ2[
NA].
Suppose φ is ∃vn/Jψ. Then by inductive hypothesis A |=
± ψ[NA]. If A |=+ ψ[NA], let
f : NA→
J
A be any function independent of J (e.g., a constant function). Then NA(n : f) ⊆ NA,
so A |=+ ψ[NA(n : f)]. Hence A |=+ ∃vn/Jψ[
NA]. If A |=− ψ[NA], then A |=− ψ[NA(n : A)]
because NA(n : A) = NA. Hence A |=− ∃vn/Jψ[
NA].
Proposition 2.8. Let A be a nonempty structure. Then Ω ∈ CsIFGN (A) if and only if at least
one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) |A| ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2;
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(b) |A| ≥ 2, N = 1, and there exist terms s and t and elements x, y ∈ A such that sA(x) =
tA(x) and sA(y) 6= tA(y);
(c) |A| ≥ 2, N = 1, and there exist an m-ary relation symbol R, terms 〈 si | i < m 〉, and
elements x, y ∈ A such that
〈sA0 (x), . . . , s
A
m−1(x)〉 ∈ R
A and 〈sA0 (y), . . . , s
A
m−1(y)〉 /∈ R
A.
Proof. If (a) is true, then A 6|=+ v0 = v1[NA] and A 6|=− v0 = v1[NA]. If (b) is true, then
A 6|=+ s = t[A] and A 6|=− s = t[A]. If (c) is true, then A 6|=+ Rs0 . . . sm−1[A] and A 6|=−
Rs0 . . . sm−1[A].
Conversely, suppose (a), (b), and (c) are all false. If |A| = 1 then Ω /∈ CsIFGN (A) by
Lemma 2.6. Suppose |A| ≥ 2 and N = 0. If A is a relational structure then CsIFG0(A) = ∅
because there are no IFG0-formulas in a purely relational language. Otherwise every atomic
IFG0-formula has the form s = t or Rs0 . . . sm−1, where all of the terms involved are closed.
In the first case either A |=+ s = t[{∅}] or A |=− s = t[{∅}], and in the second case either
A |=+ Rs0 . . . sm−1[{∅}] or A |=− Rs0 . . . sm−1[{∅}].
Suppose |A| ≥ 2, N = 1, every pair of terms s and t has the property that either for every x ∈
A, sA(x) = tA(x), or for every x ∈ A, sA(x) 6= tA(x), and every relation symbol R and sequence
of terms 〈 si | i < m 〉 has the property that either for every x ∈ A, 〈sA0 (x), . . . , s
A
m−1(x)〉 ∈ R
A
or for every x ∈ A, 〈sA0 (x), . . . , s
A
m−1(x)〉 /∈ R
A. Every atomic IFG1-formula has the form
s = t or Rs0 . . . sm−1, where all of the terms involve at most one variable. In the first case,
either A |=+ s = t[A] or A |=− s = t[A]. In the second case, A |=+ Rs0 . . . sm−1[A] or
A |=− Rs0 . . . sm−1[A].
2.4 Rooted, suited, and double-suited IFG-algebras
Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4 inspire the following definitions.
Definition. A set of teams X∗ is rooted if ∅ ∈ X∗. A pair 〈X+, X−〉 of sets of teams is rooted
if both of its coordinates are rooted. An IFG-algebra is rooted if all of its elements are rooted.
Proposition 2.9. The subalgebra of an IFG-algebra generated by a set of rooted elements is a
rooted IFG-algebra.
Proof. The constant elements 0, 1, and Dij are all rooted, and if X is rooted, then X
∪ is.
Suppose X and Y are rooted. Then ∅ ∈ (X+J Y )+ because ∅ = ∅∪J ∅ and ∅ ∈ X+, ∅ ∈ Y +.
Also, ∅ ∈ X− ∩ Y − = (X +J Y )
−.
Suppose X is rooted. Then ∅ ∈ Cn,J (X)+ because the empty function f from ∅ to A is
vacuously independent of J and ∅(n : f) = ∅ ∈ X+. Also, ∅ ∈ Cn,J(X)− because ∅(n : A) =
∅ ∈ X−.
Given a set A, let RootN (A) denote the IFGN -cylindric set algebra whose universe is the
set of all rooted elements in P(P(NA))×P(P(NA)).
Definition. A nonempty subset of P(NA) is called a suit if it is closed under subsets. That is,
a suit X∗ is a nonempty collection of subsets of NA such that V ′ ⊆ V ∈ X∗ implies V ′ ∈ X∗. A
double suit is a pair 〈X+, X−〉 of suits such that X+ ∩X− = {∅}.
Definition. An independence-friendly cylindric set algebra is suited if all of its elements are
pairs of suits. It is double-suited if all of its elements are double suits.
Note that suits, double suits, and suited independence-friendly cylindric set algebras are all
rooted.
Proposition 2.10. The subalgebra of an IFGN -algebra generated by a set of pairs of suits is a
suited IFGN -algebra.
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Proof. The constant elements 0, 1, and Dij are all pairs of suits, and if X is a pair of suits, then
so is X∪.
Suppose X and Y are pairs of suits. If V ′ ⊆ V ∈ (X +J Y )+, then V = V1 ∪J V2 for
some V1 ∈ X+, V2 ∈ Y +. Let V ′1 = V1 ∩ V
′ and V ′2 = V2 ∩ V
′. By Lemma 1.11, V ′ =
V ′1 ∪J V
′
2 , and V
′
1 ∈ X
+, V ′2 ∈ Y
+. Hence V ′ ∈ (X +J Y )
+. Thus (X +J Y )
+ is a suit.
If W ′ ⊆ W ∈ (X +J Y )− = X− ∩ Y −, then W ′ ⊆ W ∈ X− and W ′ ⊆ W ∈ Y −. Hence
W ′ ∈ X− ∩ Y − = (X +J Y )−. Thus (X +J Y )− is a suit.
Suppose X is a pair of suits. If V ′ ⊆ V ∈ Cn,J(X)+, then V (n : f) ∈ X+ for some
f : V →
J
A. Let g = f ↾ V ′. Then g : V ′ →
J
A, and V ′(n : g) ⊆ V (n : f), so V ′(n : g) ∈ X+.
Hence V ′ ∈ Cn,J(X)+. Thus Cn,J(X)+ is a suit. If W ′ ⊆ W ∈ Cn,J (X)−, then W ′(n : A) ⊆
W (n : A) ∈ X−, so W ′(n : A) ∈ X−. Hence Cn,J(X)− is a suit.
Proposition 2.11. The subalgebra of an IFGN -algebra generated by a set of double suits is a
double-suited IFGN -algebra.
Proof. The constant elements 0, 1, and Dij are all double suits, and if X is a double suit, then
so is X∪.
Suppose X and Y are double suits. We already know by the previous proposition that
X +J Y is a pair of suits. To show that (X +J Y )
+ ∩ (X +J Y )− = {∅}, suppose V ∈
(X +J Y )
+ ∩ (X +J Y )− = (X +J Y )+ ∩ X− ∩ Y −. Then V = V1 ∪J V2 for some V1 ∈ X+,
V2 ∈ Y +. Since V1 ⊆ V ∈ X− and V2 ⊆ V ∈ Y −, we have V1 ∈ X+ ∩X− and V2 ∈ Y + ∩ Y −.
Hence V1 = ∅ = V2. Thus V = ∅. Therefore X +J Y is a double suit.
Suppose X is a double suit. We already know by the previous proposition that Cn,J(X) is
a pair of suits. To show that Cn,J (X)
+ ∩Cn,J (X)− = {∅}, suppose V ∈ Cn,J (X)+ ∩Cn,J (X)−.
Then V (n : f) ∈ X+ for some f : V →
J
A, and V (n : A) ∈ X−. But V (n : f) ⊆ V (n : A), so
V (n : f) ∈ X+ ∩X−. Hence V (n : f) = ∅, which implies V = ∅. Therefore Cn,J (X) is a double
suit.
Given a set A, let SuitN (A) denote the IFGN -algebra whose universe is the set of all pairs
of suits in P(P(NA))×P(P(NA)). Let DSuitN (A) denote the IFGN -algebra whose universe
is the set of all double suits in P(P(NA))×P(P(NA)).
2.5 IFGN -algebras and De Morgan algebra
Definition. A bounded distributive lattice is an algebra L = 〈L; 0, 1,∨,∧〉 such that
(x ∨ y) ∨ z = x ∨ (y ∨ z), (x ∧ y) ∧ z = x ∧ (y ∧ z),
x ∨ y = y ∨ x, x ∧ y = y ∧ x,
x ∨ (x ∧ y) = x, x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x,
x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z), x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z),
0 ∨ x = x, 1 ∧ x = x.
We will refer to each pair of axioms except the last as associativity, commutativity, absorp-
tion, and distributivity, respectively. We can define a partial order ≤ on L by x ≤ y if and only
if x ∨ y = y (if and only if x ∧ y = x). Hence the last pair of axioms asserts that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Definition. A De Morgan algebra A = 〈A; 0, 1,∼,∨,∧〉 is a bounded distributive lattice with
an additional unary operation ∼ that satisfies ∼∼x = x and ∼(x ∨ y) = ∼x ∧ ∼y.
Proposition 2.12. Let A be a De Morgan algebra. Then A satisfies
(a) ∼(x ∧ y) = ∼x ∨∼y,
(b) ∼0 = 1,
(c) x ≤ y if and only if ∼y ≤ ∼x.
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Proof. (a) ∼(x ∧ y) = ∼(∼∼x ∧ ∼∼y) = ∼∼(∼x ∨∼y) = ∼x ∨ ∼y.
(b) ∼0 = ∼0 ∧ 1 = ∼0 ∧ ∼∼1 = ∼(0 ∨∼1) = ∼∼1 = 1.
(c) x ≤ y if and only if x ∨ y = y if and only if ∼x ∧∼y = ∼y if and only if ∼y ≤ ∼x.
Definition. A Kleene algebra A = 〈A; 0, 1,∼,∨,∧〉 is a De Morgan algebra that satisfies the
additional axiom x ∧ ∼x ≤ y ∨∼y.
Definition. A Boolean algebra A = 〈A; 0, 1,−,∨,∧〉 is a De Morgan algebra that satisfies the
complementation axioms x ∧ −x = 0 and x ∨ −x = 1.
We refer the reader to [1] for the elementary theory of De Morgan algebras.
Unlike cylindric set algebras, independence-friendly cylindric set algebras do not have an
underlying Boolean algebra structure. The complementation axioms fail. However, the reduct
of a rooted IFGN -algebra to the signature
〈0, 1, ∪,+N , ·N 〉
is a De Morgan algebra, and the same reduct of a double-suited IFGN -algebra is a Kleene
algebra.
2.5.1 Associativity and commutativity
Let C be an IFGN -algebra with base set A. Let X,Y, Z be elements in C, let i, j, k, ℓ,m, n < N ,
let J,K,L ⊆ N , and let V,W ⊆ NA.
Proposition 2.13. X +J Y = Y +J X and X ·J Y = Y ·J X.
Proof. V ∈ (X +J Y )+ if and only if V = V1 ∪J V2 for some V1 ∈ X+ and V2 ∈ Y + if and
only if V = V2 ∪J V1 for some V2 ∈ Y + and V1 ∈ X+ if and only if V ∈ (Y +J X)+. Also,
(X +J Y )
− = X− ∩ Y − = Y − ∩X− = (Y +J X)−.
Proposition 2.14. (X +J Y ) +J Z = X +J (Y +J Z) and (X ·J Y ) ·J Z = X ·J (Y ·J Z).
Proof. Suppose V ∈ ((X+J Y )+J Z)
+. Then V = (V1∪J V2)∪J V3 for some V1 ∈ X
+, V2 ∈ Y
+,
and V3 ∈ Z+. By Lemma 1.12,
V = (V1 ∪J V2) ∪J V3
= V1 ∪J V2 ∪J V3
= V1 ∪J (V2 ∪J V3).
Hence V ∈ (X +J (Y +J Z))
+. By the same argument, if V ∈ (X +J (Y +J Z))
+, then
V ∈ ((X +J Y ) +J Z)+. Therefore, ((X +J Y ) +J Z)+ = (X +J (Y +J Z))+.
In addition,
((X +J Y ) +J Z)
− = (X− ∩ Y −) ∩ Z−
= X− ∩ (Y − ∩ Z−)
= (X +J (Y +J Z))
−.
Associativity can fail if the two operations are not the same. For example, let A be the
structure with universe A = {0, 1, 2} in which each element is named by a constant symbol.
Consider the IFG1-algebra over A (that is, CsIFG1(A)). Let X = ‖v0 = 0‖, Y = ‖v0 = 1‖, and
Z = ‖v0 = 2‖. Then
X = 〈{∅, {0}}, {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}}〉,
Y = 〈{∅, {1}}, {∅, {0}, {2}, {0, 2}}〉,
Z = 〈{∅, {2}}, {∅, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}}〉.
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We claim that (X +∅ Y ) +N Z 6= X +∅ (Y +N Z). On the left,
(X +∅ Y )
+ = {∅, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}},
((X +∅ Y ) +N Z)
+ = {∅, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}, {2}},
while on the right,
(Y +N Z)
+ = {∅, {1}, {2}},
(X +∅ (Y +N Z))
+ = {∅, {0}, {1}, {2}, {0, 1}, {0, 2}}.
Of course, on the falsity-axis, ((X +∅ Y ) +N Z)
− = X− ∩ Y − ∩ Z− = (X +∅ (Y +N Z))
−.
Notice that ((X+∅Y )+NZ)
+ ⊆ (X+∅(Y+NZ))
+. This suggests the following strengthening
of Proposition 2.14.
Lemma 2.15. Let J ⊆ K. Then
(a) (X +J Y ) +K Z ≤+ X +J (Y +K Z) and (X +J Y ) +K Z =− X +J (Y +K Z);
(b) (X ·J Y ) ·K Z =+ X ·J (Y ·K Z) and (X ·J Y ) ·K Z ≤− X ·J (Y ·K Z).
Proof. (a) Suppose V ∈ ((X +J Y ) +K Z)+. Then V = (V1 ∪J V2) ∪K V3 for some V1 ∈ X+,
V2 ∈ Y
+, and V3 ∈ Z
+. By Lemma 1.10 and Lemma 1.12,
V = (V1 ∪J V2) ∪K V3
= (V1 ∪J V2) ∪J V3
= V1 ∪J V2 ∪J V3
= V1 ∪J (V2 ∪J V3).
Let V5 = V2 ∪ V3. Since V1, V2, and V3 are pairwise disjoint, we have by Lemma 1.11 that
V5 = V ∩ V5 = ((V1 ∪J V2) ∩ V5) ∪K (V3 ∩ V5) = V2 ∪K V3. Hence V5 ∈ (Y +K Z)
+. Thus
V ∈ (X +J (Y +K Z))+.
(b) This is just the dual of part (a).
2.5.2 The elements 0, Ω, ℧, and 1
Proposition 2.16. (a) X +J 0 = X = X ·J 1.
(b) X ·J 0 = 0 and X +J 1 = 1 if and only if X is rooted.
(c) Ω∪ = Ω+J Ω = Ω ·J Ω = Ω.
(d) ℧∪ = ℧+J ℧ = ℧ ·J ℧ = ℧.
Proof. (a) Suppose V ∈ (X +J 0)+. Then V = V1 ∪J V2 for some V1 ∈ X+ and V2 ∈ 0+. But
then V2 = ∅, so V1 = V . Thus V ∈ X+. Conversely, suppose V ∈ X+. Then V = V ∪J ∅,
V ∈ X+, and ∅ ∈ 0+. Thus V ∈ (X +J 0)+. Therefore (X +J 0)+ = X+. Also, (X +J 0)− =
X− ∩ 0− = X−.
(b) Suppose X ·J 0 = 0 and X +J 1 = 1. Then ∅ ∈ (X ·J 0)
+ = X+ ∩ 0+ ⊆ X+, and
∅ ∈ (X +J 1)− = X− ∩ 1− ⊆ X−. Hence X is rooted. Conversely, suppose X is rooted. Then
(X ·J 0)+ = X+ ∩ 0+ = {∅}, and for every V ⊆ NA, V = ∅ ∪J V , where ∅ ∈ X− and V ∈ 0−.
Hence V ∈ (X ·J 0)−. Thus (X ·J 0)− = P(NA). Therefore X ·J 0 = 0. Similarly, X +J 1 = 1.
(c) That Ω∪ = Ω follows immediately from the definitions. To show that Ω+JΩ = Ω, observe
that ∅ = ∅∪J ∅. Hence ∅ ∈ (Ω+JΩ)+. Conversely, if V ∈ (Ω+JΩ)+, then V = V1∪J V2 for some
V1, V2 ∈ Ω+. Hence V = V1 = V2 = ∅. Thus (Ω+JΩ)+ = Ω+. Also (Ω+JΩ)− = Ω−∩Ω− = Ω−.
(d) That ℧∪ = ℧ follows immediately from the definitions. To show that ℧ +J ℧ = ℧,
observe that for any V ⊆ NA, V = V ∪J ∅. Hence V ∈ (℧+J ℧)
+. Thus (℧+J ℧)
+ = ℧+. Also
(℧+J ℧)
− = ℧− ∩℧− = ℧−.
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Proposition 2.17. If X and Y are double suits, and X ≤ Ω ≤ Y , then X ·J Y = X and
X +J Y = Y .
Proof. Suppose X ≤ Ω ≤ Y . Then X+ = {∅} = Y −, so (X ·J Y )+ = X+ ∩ Y + = {∅} =
X− ∩ Y − = (X +J Y )−. Also, V ∈ (X +J Y )+ if and only if V ∈ Y +, and W ∈ (X ·J Y )− if
and only if W ∈ X−. Therefore X ·J Y = X and X +J Y = Y .
2.5.3 Absorption
The absorption axioms do not hold in general, but they do hold in important special cases. For
example, if X is not rooted then (X +N X)
+ = ∅ = (X ·N X)−. Hence X +N (X ·K 1) 6= X
whenever X is a nonempty, non-rooted element. In contrast, if X and Y are rooted, then the
absorption axioms hold partially for every pair of addition and multiplication operations, and
they hold fully when the “outside” operation is +N or ·N .
Lemma 2.18. If Y is rooted, then X+ ⊆ (X +J Y )+ and X− ⊆ (X ·J Y )−.
Proof. Suppose V ∈ X+. Then V = V ∪J ∅, where V ∈ X+ and ∅ ∈ Y +. Hence V ∈
(X +J Y )
+.
Lemma 2.19. If X and Y are rooted, then (X+N Y )
+ = X+∪Y + and (X ·N Y )
− = X−∪Y −.
Proof. By definition, V ∈ (X +N Y )+ if and only if V = V1 ∪N V2 for some V1 ∈ X+ and
V2 ∈ Y
+, which holds if and only if V1 = V and V2 = ∅ or vice versa. Hence V ∈ (X +N Y )
+ if
and only if V ∈ X+ or V ∈ Y +.
Lemma 2.20. Suppose X and Y are rooted. Then
(a) X ≤+ X +J (X ·K Y ) and X =− X +J (X ·K Y );
(b) X =+ X ·J (X +K Y ) and X ≤− X ·J (X +K Y ).
Thus X ·J (X +K Y ) ≤ X ≤ X +J (X ·K Y ).
Proof. (a) Suppose V ∈ X+. Then V = V ∪J ∅ where V ∈ X+ and ∅ ∈ X+ ∩ Y + = (X ·K Y )+.
Hence V ∈ (X +J (X ·K Y ))+.
Suppose W ∈ X−. Then W = W ∪K ∅, where W ∈ X− and ∅ ∈ Y −. Hence W ∈
X− ∩ (X ·K Y )− = (X +J (X ·K Y ))−. Conversely, suppose W ∈ (X +J (X ·K Y ))−. Then
W ∈ X− ∩ (X ·K Y )
− ⊆ X−.
To show that absorption can fail even when X and Y are rooted, consider the IFG2-cylindric
set algebra over the equality structure A whose universe is A = {0, 1}. Let X = D01 +N D∪01.
Then
X+ = {∅, {00}, {01}, {10}, {11}, {00, 11}, {01, 10}},
X− = {∅}.
However, {00, 01, 10, 11} ∈ (X +∅ (X +N X))
+ because {00, 01, 10, 11} = {00, 11} ∪∅ {01, 10},
where {00, 11} ∈ X+ and {01, 10} ∈ X+ = (X +N X)
+. Thus
(X +∅ (X +N X))
+ ⊃ X+.
One can obtain a similar example where (X ·∅ (X+NX))
− ⊃ X− by taking X = D01 ·ND∪01.
Notice that D01 +N D
∪
01 6= 1, which demonstrates that the complementation axioms fail in
any IFG-algebra of dimension greater than 1.
Lemma 2.21. If X is flat, then X +J (X ·K Y ) = X. If X∪ is flat, then X ·J (X +K Y ) = X.
Proof. Suppose X+ = P(V ). If V ′ ∈ (X +J (X ·K Y ))
+, then V ′ = V1 ∪J V2 for some V1 ∈ X
+
and V2 ∈ (X ·K Y )+ = X+ ∩ Y +. Hence V ′ = V1 ∪J V2 ⊆ V . Thus V ′ ∈ P(V ) = X+.
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Lemma 2.22. Suppose X and Y are rooted. Then
(a) X +N (X ·J Y ) = X;
(b) X ·N (X +J Y ) = X.
Proof. (a) First, observe that (X +N (X ·J Y ))+ = X+ ∪ (X+ ∩ Y +) = X+. Next, suppose
W ∈ (X +N (X ·J Y ))−. Then W ∈ X− ∩ (X ·J Y )− ⊆ X−. Conversely, suppose W ∈ X−.
Then W =W ∪J ∅ and W ∈ X−, ∅ ∈ Y −. Hence W ∈ (X ·J Y )−. Thus W ∈ X−∩ (X ·J Y )− =
(X +N (X ·J Y ))−.
Thus, the reduct of a rooted IFGN -algebra to the signature 〈+N , ·N 〉 is a lattice. As with
all lattices, we can define a partial order ≤′ by declaring X ≤′ Y if and only if X +N Y = Y
(or equivalently, X ·N Y = X). The next proposition shows that in a rooted IFGN -algebra, our
two partial orders ≤ and ≤′ agree.
Proposition 2.23. Suppose X and Y are rooted. Then X ≤ Y if and only if X +N Y = Y if
and only if X ·N Y = X.
Proof. First, X ≤ Y if and only if X+ ⊆ Y + and Y − ⊆ X− if and only if X+ ∪ Y + = Y + and
X− ∩ Y − = Y − if and only if (X +N Y )+ = Y + and (X +N Y )− = Y −.
Second, X ≤ Y if and only if X+ ⊆ Y + and Y − ⊆ X− if and only if X+ ∩ Y + = X+ and
X− ∪ Y − = X− if and only if (X ·N Y )
+ = X+ and (X ·N Y )
− = X−.
Proposition 2.24. If X is rooted, then 0 ≤ X ≤ 1.
Proof. By Proposition 2.16 and Proposition 2.23.
Proposition 2.25. If J ⊆ K, then X +K Y ≤ X +J Y and X ·J Y ≤ X ·K Y .
Proof. Suppose J ⊆ K. If V ∈ (X+K Y )+, then V = V1∪K V2 for some V1 ∈ X+ and V2 ∈ Y +.
But V = V1 ∪K V2 implies V = V1 ∪J V2, so V ∈ (X +J Y )+. Thus (X +K Y )+ ⊆ (X +J Y )+.
In addition, (X +J Y )
− = X− ∩ Y − = (X +K Y )−.
Therefore, when X is rooted, we have the following string of inequalities:
X ·∅ X ≤ X ·J X ≤ X ·N X = X = X +N X ≤ X +J X ≤ X +∅ X.
Proposition 2.26. If X ≤ X ′ and Y ≤ Y ′, then X +J Y ≤ X ′ +J Y ′ and X ·J Y ≤ X ′ ·J Y ′.
Proof. Suppose X ≤ X ′ and Y ≤ Y ′. If V ∈ (X +J Y )+, then V = V1 ∪J V2 for some
V1 ∈ X+ ⊆ (X ′)+ and V2 ∈ Y + ⊆ (Y ′)+. Hence V ∈ (X ′ +J Y ′)+. Also, (X ′ +J Y ′)− =
(X ′)− ∩ (Y ′)− ⊆ X− ∩ Y − = (X +J Y )
−. Thus X +J Y ≤ X
′ +J Y
′.
2.5.4 Distributivity
Lemma 2.27. Suppose X is a double suit. Then
(a) (X ·J (Y +K Z))± ⊆ ((X ·J Y ) +K (X ·J Z))±;
(b) (X +J (Y ·K Z))± ⊆ ((X +J Y ) ·K (X +J Z))±.
Proof. (a) Suppose V ∈ (X ·J (Y +K Z))+. Then V ∈ X+ ∩ (Y +K Z)+, which implies that
V = V1 ∪K V2 for some V1 ∈ Y + and V2 ∈ Z+. Observe that since V1, V2 ⊆ V ∈ X+ we have
V1, V2 ∈ X+. Hence V1 ∈ X+ ∩ Y + = (X ·J Y )+ and V2 ∈ X+ ∩ Z+ = (X ·J Z)+. Thus
V ∈ ((X ·J Y ) +K (X ·J Z))+.
Now suppose W ∈ (X ·J (Y +K Z))−. Then W = W1 ∪J W2 for some W1 ∈ X− and
W2 ∈ Y − ∩ Z−. It follows that W ∈ (X ·J Y )− ∩ (X ·J Z)− = ((X ·J Y ) +K (X ·J Z))−.
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To show that distributivity can fail, consider the IFG2-cylindric set algebra over the structure
A whose universe is A = {0, 1} and in which each element is named by a constant. Let X =
‖v0 = 0‖+N ‖v0 = 1‖, and let
V = {00, 01, 10, 11},
V1 = {00, 01},
V2 = {10, 11}.
Observe that V = V1 ∪{1} V2, V1 ∈ X
+ and V2 ∈ X+. Hence
V ∈ (X +{1} X)
+ = ((X ·J 1) +{1} (X ·J 1))
+.
However, V /∈ X+ = (X ·J (1 +{1} 1))
+.
Lemma 2.28. Suppose X, Y , and Z are rooted.
(a) X ·J (Y +N Z) =+ (X ·J Y ) +N (X ·J Z).
(b) X ·N (Y +K Z) =− (X ·N Y ) +K (X ·N Z).
(c) X +N (Y ·K Z) =+ (X +N Y ) ·K (X +N Z).
(d) X +J (Y ·N Z) =− (X +J Y ) ·N (X +J Z).
Proof.
(X ·J (Y +N Z))
+ = X+ ∩ (Y + ∪ Z+)
= (X+ ∩ Y +) ∪ (X+ ∩ Z+)
= ((X ·J Y ) +N (X ·J Z))
+.
(X ·N (Y +K Z))
− = X− ∪ (Y − ∩ Z−)
= (X− ∪ Y −) ∩ (X− ∪ Z−)
= ((X ·N Y ) +K (X ·N Z))
−.
(X +N (Y ·K Z))
+ = X+ ∪ (Y + ∩ Z+)
= (X+ ∪ Y +) ∩ (X+ ∪ Z+)
= ((X +N Y ) ·K (X +N Z))
+.
(X +J (Y ·N Z))
− = X− ∩ (Y − ∪ Z−)
= (X− ∩ Y −) ∪ (X− ∩ Z−)
= ((X +J Y ) ·N (X +J Z))
−.
The previous lemmas and propositions combine to yield the following theorem.
Theorem 2.29. The reduct of a rooted IFGN -algebra to the signature 〈0, 1,
∪,+N , ·N 〉 is a De
Morgan algebra.
2.5.5 Complementation
We have already remarked that the complementation axioms fail in independence-friendly cylin-
dric set algebras. The failure of the complementation axioms stems from the failure of the law
of excluded middle in IFG logic. However sentences of the form φ ∧/J ∼φ are never true, while
sentences of the form φ ∨/K ∼φ are never false.
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Proposition 2.30. If X and Y are double suits, then X ·J X∪ ≤ Y +K Y ∪.
Proof. Suppose X and Y are double suits. Then (X ·J X∪)+ = X+∩X− = {∅} ⊆ (Y +K Y ∪)+,
and (Y +K Y
∪)− = Y + ∩ Y − = {∅} ⊆ (X +J X∪)−.
Thus, if a double-suited IFGN -cylindric set algebra includes Ω, then
X ·J X
∪ ≤ Ω ≤ X +K X
∪.
Theorem 2.31. The reduct of a double-suited IFGN -algebra to the signature 〈0, 1, ∪,+N , ·N 〉 is
a Kleene algebra.
Even though the complementation axioms do not hold universally, it might still be possible
for particular elements to satisfy them. In a double-suited IFGN -algebra, the only elements that
satisfy the complementation axioms are 0 and 1.
Lemma 2.32. X +N X
∪ = 1 (equivalently, X ·N X∪ = 0) if and only if X+ ∪X− = P(NA)
and X+ ∩X− = {∅}.
Proof. Suppose X+NX
∪ = 1. Then X−∩X+ = (X+NX∪)− = {∅}. Hence X is rooted. Thus
X+ ∪X− = (X +N X∪)+ = P(NA).
Conversely, suppose X+ ∪ X− = P(NA) and X+ ∩ X− = {∅}. Then X is rooted, so
(X +N X
∪) = X+ ∪X− = 1+ and (X +N X∪)− = X− ∩X+ = 1−.
Lemma 2.33. Suppose X is a double suit. Then X +N X
∪ = 1 if and only if X = 0 or X = 1.
Proof. Suppose X +N X
∪ = 1. Then, by the previous lemma, (X +N X
∪)+ = X+ ∪ X− =
P(NA). In particular, NA ∈ X+ ∪ X−. If NA ∈ X+ then, since X+ is a suit, X+ = P(NA)
and X− = {∅}. Hence X = 1. Similarly, if NA ∈ X−, then X = 0.
Conversely, suppose X = 0 or X = 1. In either case, X +N X
∪ = 0 +N 1 = 1.
Definition. Let L be a bounded lattice. Two elements x, y ∈ L are complements if x ∨ y = 1
and x ∧ y = 0. An element x ∈ L is complemented if it has a complement.
For example, Ω and ℧ are complements in any IFG-algebra that includes both.
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In a double-suited IFG-algebra the only complemented elements are 0 and 1.
Lemma 2.34. Suppose X +N Y = 1 and X ·N Y = 0. Then X+ ∪ Y + = P(NA) = X− ∪ Y −
and X+ ∩ Y + = {∅} = X− ∩ Y −.
Proof. First, X+ ∩ Y + = (X ·N Y )+ = {∅} = (X +N Y )− = X− ∩ Y −. Hence X and Y are
both rooted. Thus X+ ∪ Y + = (X +N Y )+ = P(NA) = (X ·N Y )− = X− ∪ Y −.
Proposition 2.35. Suppose X and Y are double suits. Then X +N Y = 1 and X ·N Y = 0 if
and only if X = 1 and Y = 0, or vice versa.
Proof. Suppose X +N Y = 1 and X ·N Y = 0. By the previous lemma, X+ ∪ Y + = P(NA) =
X− ∪ Y − and X+ ∩ Y + = {∅} = X− ∩ Y −. In particular, NA ∈ X+ ∪ Y +. Since X and Y
are both double suits, if NA ∈ X+ then X = 1, and if NA ∈ Y + then Y = 1. In the first case,
X+ ∩Y + = {∅} and X− ∪ Y − = P(NA) imply that Y = 0, and in the second case, that Y = 1.
Conversely, suppose X = 1 and Y = 0, or vice versa. In either case, X +N Y = 0 +N 1 = 1
and X ·N Y = 0 ·N 1 = 0.
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2.6 IFGN -algebras and cylindric algebra
In addition to the axioms of Boolean algebra, the axioms of cylindric algebra [10] are:
(C1) cn(0) = 0.
(C2) x · cn(x) = x.
(C3) cn(x · cn(y)) = cn(x) · cn(y).
(C4) cmcn(x) = cncm(x).
(C5) ci(dij) = 1.
(C6) ck(dik · dkj) = dij provided k 6= i, j.
(C7) ci(dij · x) · ci(dij · −x) = 0 provided i 6= j.
We will show that analogs of the axioms (C1)–(C6) hold in all double-suited independence-
friendly cylindric set algebras. Axiom (C7) does not hold in general, even in double-suited
independence-friendly cylindric set algebras.
2.6.1 Axiom C1
Proposition 2.36. Cn,J(0) = 0 and C
∂
n,J(1) = 1.
Proof. Suppose V ∈ Cn,J(0)+. Then V (n : f) ∈ 0+ for some f : V →
J
A. But then V (n : f) = ∅,
which holds if and only if V = ∅. Thus V ∈ 0+. Conversely, suppose V ∈ 0+. Then V = ∅.
Observe that the empty function f from ∅ to A is vacuously independent of J and ∅(n : f) =
∅ ∈ 0+. Thus ∅ ∈ Cn,J(0)
+. Therefore Cn,J(0)
+ = 0+.
Cn,J(0)
− ⊆ P(NA) = 0− is immediate. To show 0− ⊆ Cn,J(0)−, suppose W ∈ 0−. Then
W ⊆ NA, so W (n : A) ⊆ NA. Hence W (n : A) ∈ 0−. Thus W ∈ Cn,J(0)−. Therefore
Cn,J(0)
− = 0−.
Proposition 2.37. If X is a double suit, then Cn,J (X) = 0 if and only if X = 0.
Proof. Observe that NA ∈ Cn,J(X)
− if and only if NA = NA(n : A) ∈ X−. Thus if X 6= 0, then
NA /∈ X−, so NA /∈ Cn,J(X)−, hence Cn,J (X) 6= 0.
Proposition 2.38. Cn,J(Ω) = Ω = C
∂
n,J (Ω) and Cn,J (℧) = ℧ = C
∂
n,J(℧).
Proof. ∅ ∈ Cn,J (Ω)+ because Ω is rooted. Conversely, suppose V ∈ Cn,J(Ω)+. Then V (n : f) ∈
Ω+ for some f : V →
J
A. Hence V (n : f) = ∅, which implies V = ∅. Thus Cn,J(Ω)+ = Ω+. Also,
W ∈ Cn,J (X)− if and only if W (n : A) ∈ Ω− if and only if W = ∅. Hence Cn,J(X)− = Ω−.
We know that Cn,J(℧) is a pair of suits because ℧ is. Thus it suffices to show that
NA ∈
Cn,J(℧)
+ and NA ∈ Cn,J(℧)−. Observe that for any f : NA→
J
A we have NA(n : f) ⊆ NA ∈ ℧+.
Hence NA ∈ Cn,J(℧)+. Also, NA(n : A) = NA ∈ ℧−. Hence NA ∈ Cn,J (℧)−.
Proposition 2.39. Cn,J(1) = 1 and C
∂
n,J(0) = 0.
Proof. That Cn,J(1)
+ ⊆ 1+ is immediate. To show 1+ ⊆ Cn,J(1)+, suppose V ∈ 1+. Define
f : V →
J
A by f(~a) = c for some arbitrary c ∈ A. Then V (n : f) ∈ 1+, so V ∈ Cn,J (1)+.
Therefore Cn,J (1)
+ = 1+.
That 1− ⊆ Cn,J(1)− is immediate. To show Cn,J (1)− ⊆ 1−, suppose W ∈ Cn,J (1)−. Then
W (n : A) ∈ 1−. Hence W (n : A) = ∅, which implies W = ∅. Thus W ∈ 1−. Therefore
Cn,J(1)
− = 1−.
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2.6.2 Axiom C2
Proposition 2.40. (a) If n /∈ J , then X ·K Cn,J(X) =+ X.
(b) If X− is a suit, then X ·N Cn,J(X) =− X.
In particular, if X is a double suit then X ·N Cn,∅(X) = X.
Proof. (a) Observe that (X ·K Cn,J (X))+ = X+ ∩ Cn,J(X)+ ⊆ X+. Conversely, suppose
V ∈ X+. If n /∈ J , the projection prn : V → A that maps ~a to an is independent of J , and
V (n : prn) = V ∈ X
+. Hence V ∈ X+ ∩Cn,J (X)+ = (X ·K Cn,J (X))+.
(b) Suppose X− is a suit and W ∈ (X ·N Cn,J(X))−. Then W =W ∪N ∅, where W ∈ X−
and ∅ ∈ Cn,J(X)−, or vice versa. If W ∈ X− we are done, so suppose W ∈ Cn,J (X)−. Then
W ⊆ W (n : A) ∈ X−; hence W ∈ X−. Conversely, suppose W ∈ X−. Since X− is a suit,
Cn,J(X)
− is also a suit. In particular, ∅ ∈ Cn,J (X)−. Hence W =W ∪N ∅, where W ∈ X− and
∅ ∈ Cn,J(X)−. Thus W ∈ (X ·N Cn,J(X))−.
To give an example where n ∈ J and X ·K Cn,J (X) 6=+ X , let A be the equality structure
with universe A = {0, 1}, and consider CsIFG2(A). Observe that
D01 = 〈P({00, 11}),P({01, 10})〉,
C0,N (D01) = 〈{∅, {00}, {11}}, {∅}〉,
(D01 ·K C0,N (D01))
+ = {∅, {00}, {11}} 6= D+01.
In section 2.5 we showed that the partial order ≤ interacts nicely with the operations ∪,
+J , and ·J (see Proposition 2.25 and Proposition 2.26). It interacts equally well with the
operations Cn,J and C
∂
n,J . In particular, the previous proposition shows that in a double-suited
IFGN -algebra, C
∂
n,J(X) ≤ X ≤ Cn,J(X) whenever n /∈ J .
2.6.3 Axiom C3
Proposition 2.41. If J ⊆ K, then Cn,K(X) ≤ Cn,J(X) and C∂n,J(X) ≤ C
∂
n,K(X).
Proof. Suppose J ⊆ K and V ∈ Cn,K(X)+. Then V (n : f) ∈ X+ for some function f : V →
K
A.
But then f : V →
J
A; hence V ∈ Cn,J(X)+. Also Cn,J (X)− = Cn,K(X)− by definition.
Proposition 2.42. If X ≤ Y then Cn,J (X) ≤ Cn,J (Y ) and C∂n,J(X) ≤ C
∂
n,J(Y ).
Proof. Suppose X ≤ Y and V ∈ Cn,J (X)+. Then V (n : f) ∈ X+ ⊆ Y + for some f : V →
J
A.
Hence V ∈ Cn,J(Y )+. Now suppose W ∈ Cn,J(Y )−. Then W (n : A) ∈ Y − ⊆ X−. Hence
W ∈ Cn,J (X)
−.
Proposition 2.43. (a) If J ⊆ K, then Cn,J(X ·L Cn,K(Y )) ≤+ Cn,J(X) ·L Cn,J(Y ).
(b) If n ∈ K, then Cn,J (X ·L Cn,K(Y )) =+ Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ).
(c) If n ∈ L, then
Cn,J(X) ·L Cn,K(Y ) ≤
− Cn,J(X ·L Cn,K(Y )),
Cn,J(X ·L Cn,K(Y )) ≤
− Cn,P (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y )).
(d) If n ∈ L and (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))− is a suit, then
Cn,J(X ·L Cn,K(Y )) =
− Cn,J(X) ·L Cn,K(Y ).
Thus, if X and Y are double suits and n ∈ K ∩ L, then
Cn,J(X ·L Cn,K(Y )) = Cn,J(X) ·L Cn,K(Y ).
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Proof. (a) Suppose V ∈ (Cn,J (X ·L Cn,K(Y )))+. Then there is an f : V →
J
A such that
V (n : f) ∈ (X ·L Cn,K(Y ))
+ = X+ ∩ Cn,K(Y )
+,
which implies that there is a g : V (n : f)→
K
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) ∈ Y +. By Lemma 1.16,
if J ⊆ K there is an h : V →
J
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h). Hence V ∈ Cn,J (X)+ ∩
Cn,J(Y )
+ = (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,J(Y ))
+.
(b) Suppose V ∈ Cn,J (X ·L Cn,K(Y ))+. Then there is a function f : V →
J
A such that
V (n : f) ∈ (X ·L Cn,K(Y ))
+ = X+ ∩ Cn,K(Y )
+,
which implies that there is a function g : V (n : f) →
K
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) ∈ Y +. If
n ∈ K, then by Lemma 1.16 there is a function h : V →
K
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h).
Hence V ∈ Cn,J (X)+ ∩ Cn,K(Y )+ = (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))+.
Conversely, suppose V ∈ (Cn,J(X) ·LCn,K(Y ))
+ = Cn,J (X)
+∩Cn,J (Y )
+. Then there exist
f : V →
J
A and h : V →
J
A such that V (n : f) ∈ X+ and V (n : h) ∈ Y +. If n ∈ K, then by
Lemma 1.17 there is a g : V (n : f) →
K
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h). It follows that
V (n : f) ∈ X+ ∩ Cn,K(Y )+ = (X ·L Cn,K(Y ))+. Hence V ∈ (Cn,J (X ·L Cn,K(Y )))+.
(c) Suppose n ∈ L and W ∈ (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))
−. Then W = W1 ∪L W2 for some
W1 ∈ Cn,J (X)− and W2 ∈ Cn,K(Y )−, which implies W1(n : A) ∈ X− and W2(n : A) ∈ Y −. By
Lemma 1.19, W (n : A) = W1(n : A) ∪L W2(n : A). Also, W2(n : A)(n : A) = W2(n : A) ∈ Y −,
so W2(n : A) ∈ Cn,K(Y )−. Thus, W (n : A) ∈ (X ·L Cn,K(Y ))−. Therefore we have W ∈
(Cn,J (X ·L Cn,K(Y )))−.
Suppose W ∈ (Cn,J(X ·L Cn,K(Y )))−. Then W (n : A) ∈ (X ·L Cn,K(Y ))−, which means
W (n : A) = W1 ∪L W2 for some W1 ∈ X− and W2 ∈ Cn,K(Y )−. By Lemma 1.19, W1 =
W1(n : A), hence W1 ∈ Cn,J(X)−. Thus W (n : A) ∈ (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))−. Therefore
W ∈ Cn,P (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))
−.
(d) If (Cn,J(X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))− is a suit, then W ⊆ W (n : A) ∈ (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))−
implies W ∈ (Cn,J (X) ·L Cn,K(Y ))−.
To give an example where (b) fails, again let A be the equality structure with universe
A = {0, 1}, and consider CsIFG2(A). Setting X = 1 and Y = D01, observe that
D01 ≤ C1,{0}(D01) = C1,N (1) ·L C1,{0}(D01).
In particular, {00, 11} ∈ (C1,N (1) ·L C1,{0}(D01))
+. However,
{00, 11} /∈ C1,N (1 ·L C1,{0}(D01))
+.
To see why, suppose the contrary. Then there is an f : {00, 11} →
N
A such that {00, 11}(1 : f) ∈
(1 ·LC1,{0}(D01))
+ = C1,{0}(D01)
+. Hence f is a constant function. Thus, either {00, 11}(1 : f)
= {00, 10} ∈ C1,{0}(D01)
+ or {00, 11}(1 : f) = {01, 11} ∈ C1,{0}(D01)
+. In the first case,
{00, 10}(1 : g) ∈ D+01 for some g : {00, 10} →
{0}
A. Since g is a constant function, either {00, 10}(1 :
g) = {00, 10} or {00, 10}(1 : g) = {01, 11}. Note that neither set belongs to D+01. The second
case is similar.
2.6.4 Axiom C4
Proposition 2.44. (a) Cn,J(Cn,K(X)) ≤ Cn,J∩K(X).
(b) If n ∈ K, then Cn,J (Cn,K(X)) = Cn,K(X).
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Proof. (a) Suppose V ∈ Cn,J(Cn,K(X))+. Then V (n : f)(n : g) ∈ X+ for some f : V →
J
A and
g : V (n : f)→
K
A. By Lemma 1.16 there is an h : V →
J∩K
A such that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h).
Hence V ∈ Cn,J∩K(X)+. Also, W ∈ Cn,J(Cn,K(X))− if and only if W (n : A)(n : A) ∈ X− if
and only if W (n : A) ∈ X− if and only if W ∈ Cn,J∩K(X)−.
(b) If n ∈ K, then the h from above is independent of K, so V ∈ Cn,K(X)+. Conversely,
suppose V ∈ Cn,K(X)
+. Then there is a function h : V →
K
A such that V (n : h) ∈ X+. Let
f : V →
J
A be any function independent of J . By Lemma 1.17 there is a g : V (n : f)→
K
A such
that V (n : f)(n : g) = V (n : h). Hence V ∈ Cn,J (Cn,K(X))+.
Proposition 2.45. If m ∈ K and n ∈ J , where m 6= n, then
Cm,J (Cn,K(X)) = Cn,K(Cm,J (X)).
Proof. Suppose V ∈ Cm,J(Cn,K(X))+. Then there exist functions f : V →
J
A and g : V (m :
f) →
K
A such that V (m : f)(n : g) ∈ X+. By Lemma 1.18 there exist G : V →
K
A and
F : V (n : G) →
J
A such that V (m : f)(n : g) = V (n : G)(m : F ). Hence V ∈ Cn,K(Cm,J (X))
+.
Thus Cm,J (Cn,K(X))
+ ⊆ Cn,K(Cm,J (X))+. The reverse containment follows by symmetry.
Therefore
Cm,J(Cn,K(X))
+ = Cn,K(Cm,J (X))
+.
Observe that W ∈ Cm,J (Cn,K(X))− if and only if W (m : A)(n : A) ∈ X− if and only if
W (n : A)(m : A) ∈ X− if and only if W ∈ Cn,K(Cm,J(X))−.
2.6.5 Axiom C5
Proposition 2.46. If j /∈ J , then Ci,J (Dij) = 1.
Proof. That Ci,J (Dij)
+ ⊆ 1+ is immediate. To show 1+ ⊆ Ci,J (Dij)+, suppose V ∈ 1+. Define
f : V →
J
A by f(~a) = aj . Observe that f is independent of J because j /∈ J . Also note that
V (i : f) = {~a(i : aj) | ~a ∈ V } ∈ D
+
ij . Hence V ∈ Ci,J (Dij)
+. Therefore Ci,J (Dij)
+ = 1+.
We know ∅ ∈ Ci,J (Dij)−, so to show Ci,J (Dij)− = {∅} = 1− it suffices to show that any
W ∈ Ci,J (Dij)− must be empty. Suppose W ∈ Ci,J (Dij)−. Then by definition W (i : A) ∈ D
−
ij .
It follows that W = ∅ because if ~a ∈ W , then ~a(i : aj) ∈ W (i : A), which contradictsW (i : A) ∈
D−ij . Therefore Ci,J(Dij)
− = 1−.
To show that the hypothesis j /∈ J is necessary, let A be the equality structure A with
universe is A = {0, 1}, and consider CsIFG2(A). Observe that
C0,N (D01) = 〈P({00, 10})∪P({01, 11}), {∅}〉.
2.6.6 Axiom C6
Proposition 2.47. If i /∈ J or j /∈ J , and i 6= k 6= j, then
Ck,J (Dik ·∅ Dkj) = Dij .
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose i /∈ J and i 6= k 6= j. Suppose V ∈ Ck,J (Dik ·∅Dkj)
+.
Then there is an f : V →
J
A such that V (k : f) ∈ (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
+ = D+ik ∩ D
+
kj . Thus every
~b ∈ V (k : f) has the property that bi = bk = bj . Let ~a ∈ V . Then ~a(k : f(~a)) ∈ V (k : f), so
ai = aj . Therefore V ∈ D
+
ij .
Conversely, suppose V ∈ D+ij . Then every ~a ∈ V has the property that ai = aj . Since i /∈ J ,
the projection pri : V →
J
A is independent of J , and every ~b ∈ V (k : pri) has the property that
bi = bk = bj . Hence V (k : pri) ∈ D
+
ik ∩D
+
kj = (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
+. Thus V ∈ Ck,J (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
+.
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Now suppose W ∈ Ck,J (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
−. Then W (k : A) ∈ (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
−, which means
W (k : A) = W1 ∪∅ W2 for some W1 ∈ D
−
ik and W2 ∈ D
−
kj . To show that W ∈ D
−
ij , suppose to
the contrary that W /∈ D−ij . Then there is an ~a ∈W such that ai = aj . Let
~b = ~a(k : ai). Then
~b ∈ W (k : A), but ~b /∈ W1 and ~b /∈ W2, which contradicts the fact that W (k : A) = W1 ∪W2 is
a disjoint cover. Therefore W ∈ D−ij .
Conversely, suppose W ∈ D−ij . Then every ~a ∈ W has the property that ai 6= aj . Let
W1 = {~a ∈ W (k : A) | ai 6= ak } and W2 = {~a ∈ W (k : A) | ai = ak }. Then we have
W (k : A) = W1 ∪∅ W2, W1 ∈ D
−
ik, and W2 ∈ D
−
kj . Hence W (k : A) ∈ (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
−. Thus
W ∈ Ck,J (Dik ·∅ Dkj)
−.
2.6.7 Axiom C7
Axiom C7 is a complementation axiom, so it is not surprising that it fails in IFG-algebras.
Nevertheless, like the Boolean complementation axioms, axiom C7 fails in a nice way.
Proposition 2.48. If X is a double suit and i 6= j, then
Ci,K(Dij ·J X) ·L Ci,K(Dij ·J X
∪) ≤ Ω.
Proof. Suppose V ∈ (Ci,K(Dij ·J X) ·L Ci,K(Dij ·J X∪))+. Then V ∈ Ci,K(Dij ·J X)+ and
V ∈ Ci,K(Dij ·J X∪)+, which means that V (i : f) ∈ (Dij ·J X)+ = D
+
ij ∩ X
+ and also
V (i : g) ∈ (Dij ·J X∪)+ = D
+
ij ∩X
− for some f : V →
K
A and g : V →
K
A. Hence, for every ~a ∈ V ,
f(~a) = aj = g(~a), so f = g and V (i : f) = V (i : g). Thus V (i : f) ∈ X+ ∩ X− = {∅}, which
implies V = ∅.
Thus an IFG-formula of the form
∃vi/K(vi = vj ∧/J φ) ∧/L ∃vi/K(vi = vj ∧/J ∼φ)
is never true. However, it might not be false. Let A be the structure whose universe is A = {0, 1}
and in which every element is named by a constant, and consider the 2-dimensional IFG-cylindric
set algebra over A. Let X = ‖v0 = 0‖+N ‖v0 = 1‖. Then
(C0,∅(D01 ·∅ X) ·∅ C0,∅(D01 ·∅ X
∪))− 6= 0−.
To see why, suppose to the contrary that NA ∈ (C0,∅(D01 ·∅ X) ·∅ C0,∅(D01 ·∅ X
∪))−. Then
NA = W1 ∪ W2 for some W1 ∈ C0,∅(D01 ·∅ X)
− and W2 ∈ C0,∅(D01 ·∅ X
∪)−. Consider the
valuations 00 and 11. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that 00 ∈ W1. Then 00 ∈ W1(0 :
A) ∈ (D01 ·∅X)
−, which means W1(0 : A) =W3 ∪W4 for some W3 ∈ D
−
01 and W4 ∈ X
− = {∅}.
Hence 00 ∈ W3 ∈ D
−
01, which contradicts the definition of D
−
01. Thus 00 /∈ W1. Similarly,
11 /∈ W1. Therefore, {00, 11} ⊆ W2, which means {00, 01, 10, 11} ⊆ W2(0 : A) ∈ (D01 ·J X∪)−.
Hence {00, 01, 10, 11}=W5 ∪W6 for some W5 ∈ D
−
01 and W6 ∈ X
+. Without loss of generality
we may assumeW5 = {01, 10} andW6 = {00, 11}, which contradicts the fact that {00, 11} /∈ X+.
2.6.8 More on cylindrifications
Lemma 2.49. Suppose X is rooted.
(a) C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X)
+ = {∅} if and only if X+ = {∅}.
(b) C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)
+ = P(NA) if and only if there is an ~a ∈ NA such that {~a} ∈ X+;
otherwise C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)
+ = {∅}.
(c) C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X)
− = P(NA) if and only if NA ∈ X−.
(d) C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X)
− = {∅} if and only if NA /∈ X−.
28
Proof. (a) If X+ = {∅}, then for any V ⊆ NA we have V ∈ C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X)
+ if and
only if there exist f0, . . . , fN−1 such that V (0 : f0) . . . (N − 1 : fn−1) = ∅ if and only if
V = ∅. Hence C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X)
+ = {∅}. Conversely, if there is a nonempty V ∈ X+, then
V (0 : pr0) . . . (N − 1 : prN−1) = V ∈ X
+, so V ∈ C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X)
+.
(b) Suppose {~a} ∈ X+, and let fn be the function that takes the constant value an. Then
for any V ⊆ NA, V (0 : f0) . . . (N − 1, fN−1) = {~a} ∈ X+. Hence V ∈ C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)+.
Thus C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)
+ = P(NA). Conversely, suppose C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)
+ = P(NA).
Then there exist constant functions fn such that
NA(0 : f0) . . . (N − 1 : fN−1) ∈ X+. Let an be
the constant value taken by fn. Then
NA(0 : f0) . . . (N − 1 : fN−1) = {~a}.
If there is no ~a ∈ NA such that {~a} ∈ X+, then for any nonempty V ⊆ NA and constant
functions f0, . . . , fN−1, V (0 : f0) . . . (N − 1 : fN−1) /∈ X+. Hence V /∈ C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)+.
Thus C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X)
+ = {∅}.
(c) and (d) Let W ⊆ NA. By definition W ∈ C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X)
− if and only if
W (0 : A) . . . (N − 1, A) ∈ X−. If W = ∅, then W (0 : A) . . . (N − 1, A) = ∅, otherwise W (0 :
A) . . . (N − 1, A) = NA.
Corollary 2.50. If X is a pair of suits, then
C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X) =

1 if X 6≤ Ω and X 6≤ ℧,
Ω if 0 < X ≤ Ω,
℧ if 0 < X ≤ ℧,
0 if X = 0.
Proposition 2.51. If X is a double suit, then
C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X) =

1 if X 6≤ Ω,
Ω if 0 < X ≤ Ω,
0 if X = 0.
Proof. By Proposition 2.41 and Proposition 2.42,
C0,N . . . CN−1,N (X) ≤ C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X).
Thus C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X) = 1 if X 6≤ Ω. If 0 < X ≤ Ω, then X
+ = {∅} and NA /∈ X−.
Hence C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X) = Ω. Finally, C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(0) = 0 by Proposition 2.36.
In terms of IFG logic, what Proposition 2.51 says is that the semantic game associated with
∃v0/J0 . . .∃vN−1/JN−1φ is like the game associated with φ except that Elo¨ıse is allowed to choose
the initial valuation. Since Elo¨ıse can use constant functions to specify any initial valuation she
wishes, the amount of information available to her is irrelevant.
Theorem 2.52. If C is a double-suited IFG-algebra and |C| > 2, then Ω ∈ C.
Proof. Suppose X ∈ C \ {0, 1}. Then NA /∈ X+ ∪ X−, and there exists a nonempty team
V ∈ X+ ∪ X−. Hence (X ·N X∪)+ = X+ ∩X− = {∅}, and V ∈ X+ ∪ X− = (X ·N X∪)−, so
C0,N · · ·CN−1,N(X ·N X∪) = Ω.
2.7 The trivial algebra and IFG0-algebras
Thus far we have neglected the case when the base set A = ∅. If A = ∅ and N > 0, then
NA = ∅. Hence 0 = 1 = Dij = Ω = ℧. Thus, by Proposition 2.16 and Proposition 2.38, {Ω} is
an IFGN -algebra. We will refer to {Ω} as the trivial IFGN -algebra.
Proposition 2.53. The trivial algebra {Ω} is the only double-suited IFGN -algebra with an
empty base set. In fact, it is the only rooted IFGN -algebra with an empty base set. It is also the
only IFGN -algebra with only one element.
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Proof. If A = ∅ then P(P(NA))×P(P(NA)) is {〈∅, ∅〉, 〈∅, {∅}〉, 〈{∅}, ∅〉, 〈{∅}, {∅}〉}. The only
rooted element is 〈{∅}, {∅}〉, which is a double suit.
Suppose C is an IFGN -algebra such that |C| = 1. Then the base set A must be empty
because otherwise 0 = 〈{∅},P(NA)〉 6= 〈P(NA), {∅}〉 = 1.
If N = 0, then NA = {∅}. It is important to distinguish between the empty team ∅ and
the team that includes only the empty valuation {∅}. To avoid confusion let ~a = ∅ be the
empty valuation. Then P(P(NA)) × P(P(NA)) = P(P({~a})) × P(P({~a})) has sixteen
elements. The only suits are {∅} and P({~a}), so the only pairs of suits are 0 = 〈{∅},P({~a})〉,
Ω = 〈{∅}, {∅}〉, ℧ = 〈P({~a}),P({~a})〉, and 1 = 〈P({~a}), {∅}〉. Thus there are three suited
IFG0-algebras:
1
0
1
Ω
0
1
  
  
  
 
??
??
??
?
Ω
??
??
??
? ℧
  
  
  
 
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3 Finite Axiomatizability
We would like to know whether the equational theory of IFGN -algebras is finitely axiomatiz-
able. Unfortunately determining the answer is beyond our current abilities, even in the one-
dimensional case. To make the problem more tractable, we consider certain reducts of IFG1-
algebras. First we will examine reducts of IFG1-algebras to the signature 〈0, 1, ∪,+{0}, ·{0}〉.
Then will consider reducts to the signature
〈0, 1, ∪,+{0}, ·{0}, C0,{0}〉.
3.1 The De Morgan reduct
Definition. The reduct of an IFGN -cylindric set algebra C to the signature 〈0, 1, ∪,+N , ·N 〉 is
called the De Morgan reduct of C.
Definition. An element x of a De Morgan algebra is a fixed point (or center) if ∼x = x. A
centered De Morgan algebra is a De Morgan algebra with a center.
Proposition 3.1. The center of a centered Kleene algebra is unique.
Proof. Suppose a and b are both fixed points of a centered Kleene algebra. Then a = a∧∼a ≤
b ∨ ∼b = b, and b = b ∧ ∼b ≤ a ∨ ∼a = a.
LetB be the two-element De Morgan algebra, letK be the three-element De Morgan algebra
with fixed point a, and let M be the four-element De Morgan algebra with two fixed points a
and b such that a ∧ b = 0 and a ∨ b = 1:
1 1 1
~~
~~
~~
~~
@@
@@
@@
@@
0 a a
@@
@@
@@
@@
b
~~
~~
~~
~~
0 0
B K M
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Theorem 3.2 (Kalman [17]). The subdirectly irreducible De Morgan algebras are exactly B, K,
and M.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2 and Birkhoff’s subdirect
representation theorem (II§8.6 in [2]).
Corollary 3.3. Every De Morgan algebra is isomorphic to a subdirect product of copies of B,
K, and M.
Corollary 3.4. (a) Every Kleene algebra is isomorphic to a subdirect product of copies of B
and K.
(b) Every centered Kleene algebra is isomorphic to a subdirect product of copies of K.
(c) Every De Morgan algebra that has a subalgebra isomorphic to M is isomorphic to a sub-
direct product of copies of M.
Proof. (a) Let A be a Kleene algebra. If M were a factor in a subdirect representation of A,
then M would be a homomorphic image of A, and hence a Kleene algebra.
(b) Let A be a Kleene algebra, and let B be a subdirect representation of A. If B is a factor
of B (say the first), then every tuple in B has the form 〈0, . . .〉 or 〈1, . . .〉, so no tuple in B is a
fixed point.
(c) Let A be a De Morgan algebra, and let B be a subdirect representation of A. If B is a
factor of B, then B would have no fixed points at all, and if K is a factor of B (say the first),
then every fixed point in B would have the form 〈a, . . .〉, so no two fixed points could meet to
〈0, 0, . . .〉 or join to 〈1, 1, . . .〉.
Let B denote the variety of Boolean algebras, K denote the variety of Kleene algebras, and
M denote the variety of De Morgan algebras.
Theorem 3.5 (Kalman [17]). The nontrivial subvarieties of M are B ⊂ K ⊂M.
Theorem 3.6. The variety generated by the De Morgan reducts of all suited IFGN -algebras is
M. The variety generated by the De Morgan reducts of all double-suited IFGN -algebras is K.
Proof. The De Morgan reduct of every suited IFGN -algebra is a De Morgan algebra. Hence
the variety generated by the De Morgan reducts of all suited IFGN -algebras is contained in M.
On the other hand, {0, 1}, {0,Ω, 1}, and {0,Ω,℧, 1} are all suited IFGN -algebras, and their De
Morgan reducts are isomorphic to B, K, and M, respectively. Thus the De Morgan reducts
of suited IFGN -algebras generate all the subdirectly irreducible De Morgan algebras, which in
turn generate M.
The De Morgan reduct of every double-suited IFGN -algebra is a Kleene algebra. Hence the
variety generated by the De Morgan reducts of all double-suited IFGN -algebras is contained inK.
On the other hand, {0, 1} ∼= B and {0,Ω, 1} ∼= K are both double-suited IFGN -algebras. Thus
the De Morgan reducts of double-suited IFGN -algebras generate all the subdirectly irreducible
Kleene algebras, which in turn generate K.
It follows from Theorem 3.6 that the equational theory of De Morgan reducts of suited
IFGN -algebras is axiomatized by the axioms of De Morgan algebra, and the equational theory
of De Morgan reducts of double-suited IFGN -algebras is axiomatized by the axioms of Kleene
algebra.
3.2 Monadic De Morgan algebras
A monadic Boolean algebra is a Boolean algebra with an additional unary operation called a
quantifier. Monadic Boolean algebras were first studied by Halmos [8] following the investiga-
tions of McKinsey and Tarski [19] into the algebraic properties of closure operators. Cignoli
[5] generalized the notion of a monadic Boolean algebra by adding quantifiers to bounded dis-
tributive lattices. Cignoli calls a bounded distributive lattice with a quantifier a Q-distributive
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lattice. Petrovich [20, 21] extended the results of Cignoli to monadic De Morgan algebras. Our
presentation follows [21].
Definition. An existential quantifier on a bounded distributive lattice is a unary operation ∇
such that:
(Q1) ∇0 = 0,
(Q2) x ≤ ∇x,
(Q3) ∇(x ∨ y) = ∇x ∨ ∇y,
(Q4) ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = ∇x ∧∇y.
A universal quantifier is a unary operation ∆ such that:
(Q1′) ∆1 = 1,
(Q2′) ∆x ≤ x,
(Q3′) ∆(x ∧ y) = ∆x ∧∆y,
(Q4′) ∆(x ∨∆y) = ∆x ∨∆y.
The two kinds of quantifiers are dual to each other in the usual way. A quantifier without mod-
ification is assumed to be existential. A Q-distributive lattice 〈L,∇〉 is a bounded distributive
lattice L equipped with a quantifier ∇.
Definition. An quantifier on a De Morgan algebra must satisfy the additional condition:
(Q5) ∇(∼∇x) = ∼∇x.
A De Morgan algebra equipped with a quantifier is called a monadic De Morgan algebra.
Proposition 3.7. In any Q-distributive lattice,
(a) ∇1 = 1,
(b) ∇∇x = ∇x.
Proof. (a) 1 ≤ ∇1 by axiom Q2, and ∇1 ≤ 1 because for all x, x ≤ 1.
(b) ∇∇x = ∇(1 ∧ ∇x) = ∇1 ∧ ∇x = 1 ∧ ∇x = ∇x.
Lemma 3.8. If A is a De Morgan algebra, and ∇ is a quantifier on its underlying distributive
lattice, then ∇ is a quantifier on A if and only if the range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A.
Proof. Suppose ∇ is a quantifier on A. Then 0 = ∇0, 1 = ∇1, and ∼∇x = ∇(∼∇x). Also,
∇x ∨ ∇y = ∇(x ∨ y), and ∇x ∧ ∇y = ∇(x ∧ ∇y). Thus the range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A.
Conversely, suppose the range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A. Then ∼∇x is in the range of ∇, so
∇(∼∇x) = ∼∇x.
Example. Let A be a De Morgan algebra, and let ∇ be defined by
∇x =
{
1 if x > 0,
0 if x = 0.
Then ∇ is a quantifier on A. Such a quantifier will be called a quantifier of type 0 . If A is any
De Morgan algebra, then 〈A,∇0〉 will denote the monadic De Morgan algebra A with the type
0 quantifier. In particular, 〈B,∇0〉, 〈K,∇0〉, and 〈M,∇0〉 are all monadic De Morgan algebras.
Lemma 3.9. If A is a centered Kleene algebra with fixed point c, then
{ x ∈ A | x ∧ c = 0 } = {0}.
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Proof. If A is a centered Kleene algebra with fixed point c, then A is isomorphic to a subdirect
product B of copies of K. If x 6= 0 in A, then the corresponding tuple ~y ∈ B has at least one
nonzero coordinate yi. Let ~a = 〈a, a, . . .〉 be the fixed point of B. Then yi ∈ {a, 1}, so yi∧a = a
in K. Hence ~y ∧ ~a 6= ~0 in B. Thus x ∧ c 6= 0 in A.
Example. Let A be a centered De Morgan algebra, and let a be a fixed point of A. Define ∇ by
∇x =

1 if x 6≤ a,
a if 0 < x ≤ a,
0 if x = 0.
Then ∇ is a quantifier on A if and only if { x ∈ A | x ∧ a = 0 } = {0}. Such a quantifier will
be called a quantifier of type 1 . If A is a centered Kleene algebra with fixed point a, then a
is unique and { x ∈ A | x ∧ a = 0 } = {0}. Hence ∇ is a quantifier on A. If A is a centered
Kleene algebra, let 〈A,∇1〉 denote the monadic Kleene algebra A with the type 1 quantifier. In
particular, 〈K,∇1〉 is a monadic Kleene algebra.
Lemma 3.10. Let L be a bounded distributive lattice. If a ∧ b = 0 and a ∨ b = 1, then
{ x ∈ L | x ∧ a = 0 } = [0, b] and { x ∈ L | x ∧ b = 0 } = [0, a].
Proof. If 0 ≤ x ≤ b, then 0 ≤ a ∧ x ≤ a ∧ b = 0. Hence x ∧ a = 0. Conversely, if x ∧ a = 0, then
x ∨ b = (x ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ b) = (x ∧ a) ∨ b = b.
Thus 0 ≤ x ≤ b.
Example. Let A be a centered De Morgan algebra with two fixed points a and b such that
a ∧ b = 0 and a ∨ b = 1, i.e., A contains a subalgebra isomorphic to M. Define ∇ by
∇x =

1 if x 6≤ a and x 6≤ b,
a if 0 < x ≤ a,
b if 0 < x ≤ b,
0 if x = 0.
It is easy to check that ∇ satisfies axioms Q1–Q3. To check Q4, suppose x, y ∈ A. If x = 0
or y = 0, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = 0 = ∇x ∧ ∇y. If 0 < x, y ≤ a, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = a = ∇x ∧ ∇y.
Similarly, if 0 < x, y ≤ b, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = b = ∇x ∧ ∇y. If x 6≤ a, b and 0 < y ≤ a, then
x ∧ a 6= 0 by Lemma 3.10, so
∇(x ∧ ∇y) = ∇(x ∧ a) = a = 1 ∧ a = ∇x ∧∇y.
Similarly, if x 6≤ a, b and 0 < y ≤ b, then x ∧ b 6= 0, so
∇(x ∧ ∇y) = ∇(x ∧ b) = b = 1 ∧ b = ∇x ∧ ∇y.
Finally, if y 6≤ a, b, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = ∇(x ∧ 1) = ∇x = ∇x ∧ 1 = ∇x ∧∇y.
Thus ∇ is a quantifier on the underlying bounded distributive lattice of A, and since the
range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A, Lemma 3.8 tells us that ∇ is a quantifier on A. Such a quantifier
will be called a quantifier of type 2 . If A is a De Morgan algebra with two specified fixed points
a and b, then 〈A,∇2〉 will denote the monadic De Morgan algebra A with the associated type 2
quantifier. In particular, 〈M,∇2〉 is a monadic De Morgan algebra.
Proposition 3.11 (Petrovich [21]). Let 〈A,∇〉 be a subdirectly irreducible monadic De Morgan
algebra. Then the range of ∇ is a subdirectly irreducible De Morgan algebra.
Corollary 3.12 (Petrovich [21]). Let 〈A,∇〉 be a subdirectly irreducible monadic De Morgan
algebra. Then ∇ is a quantfier of type 0, a quantifer of type 1, or a quantifier of type 2.
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The varieties of monadic Boolean, Kleene, and De Morgan algebras will be denoted by B∇,
K∇, andM∇, respectively. We can form subvarieties of M∇ by imposing additional conditions
on ∇. For example, let M∇01 denote the variety of monadic De Morgan algebras that satisfy
the equation equivalent to
∇x ∧∼∇x ≤ ∇y ∨ ∼∇y,
i.e., the range of ∇ is a Kleene algebra, and let M∇0 denote the variety of monadic De Morgan
algebras that satisfy the equation
∇x ∧ ∼∇x = 0,
i.e., the range of ∇ is a Boolean algebra. It follows that if 〈A,∇〉 is a subdirectly irreducible
monadic De Morgan algebra in M∇01 , then ∇ must be a quantifier of type 0 or 1, and if it is
subdirectly irreducible in M∇0 , then ∇ is a quantifier of type 0. Similarly, let K∇0 denote the
variety of monadic Kleene algebras that satisfy ∇x ∧ ∼∇x = 0. In particular, we have that
〈M,∇2〉 belongs to M∇ but not M∇01 , that 〈M,∇0〉 belongs to M∇0 but not K∇, and that
〈K,∇1〉 belongs to K∇ but not M∇0 . Also, M∇0 ∩ K∇ = K∇0 , and 〈K,∇0〉 belongs to K∇0
but not B∇.
Thus we have the following sublattice of the lattice of subvarieties of M∇:
M∇
M∇01
M∇0 ∨ K∇
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
KK
KK
KK
KK
KK
M∇0
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
K∇
ss
ss
ss
ss
ss
K∇0
B∇
To show that M∇0 ∨ K∇ is properly contained in M∇01 will require some results from
universal algebra.
Definition. A class of algebras is congruence-distributive if the congruence lattice of every
algebra in the class is distributive.
Theorem 3.13 (Jo´nsson [16]). A variety V is congruence-distributive if and only if for some
integer n ≥ 2 there exist terms p0(x, y, z), . . . , pn(x, y, z) such that V satisfies
p0(x, y, z) = x,
pn(x, y, z) = z,
pi(x, y, x) = x 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
pi(x, x, y) = pi+1(x, x, y) for i even,
pi(x, y, y) = pi+1(x, y, y) for i odd.
Example. The variety of lattices is congruence-distributive because it has Jo´nsson terms
p0(x, y, z) = x,
p1(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (y ∧ z) ∨ (z ∧ x),
p2(x, y, z) = z.
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It follows that any algebra that has an underlying lattice structure is congruence-distributive.
In particular, the variety of De Morgan algebras and the variety of monadic De Morgan algebras
are both congruence-distributive.
Lemma 3.14 (Jo´nsson [16]). If V1 and V2 are varieties such that V1 ∨ V2 is congruence-
distributive, then every member of V1 ∨ V2 is isomorphic to a subdirect product of a member
of V1 and a member of V2 and, in particular, every subdirectly irreducible member of V1 ∨ V2
belongs either to V1 or V2.
Corollary 3.15 (Jo´nsson [16]). If V is a congruence-distributive variety, then then lattice of
all subvarieties of V is distributive.
Lemma 3.16. There is a simple monadic De Morgan algebra 〈A,∇〉 with a quantifier of type
1 such that A is not a Kleene algebra.
Proof. Let A be the following subalgebra of K ×M, where a is the fixed point of K, and b, c
are the fixed points of M:
〈1, 1〉
〈a, 1〉
xx
xx
xx
xx
FF
FF
FF
FF
〈a, b〉
FF
FF
FF
FF
〈a, c〉
xx
xx
xx
xx
〈a, 0〉
〈0, 0〉
Consider the fixed point 〈a, b〉. The only x ∈ A that satisfies x∧〈a, b〉 = 〈0, 0〉 is 〈0, 0〉. Therefore
{〈0, 0〉, 〈a, b〉, 〈1, 1〉} is the range of a type 1 quantifier ∇ on A.
To show that 〈A,∇〉 is simple, suppose 〈0, 0〉 ≡ 〈a, 0〉. Then 〈0, 0〉 = ∇〈0, 0〉 ≡ ∇〈a, 0〉 =
〈a, b〉, which implies 〈1, 1〉 = ∼〈0, 0〉 ≡ ∼〈a, b〉 = 〈a, b〉. Hence 〈0, 0〉 ≡ 〈1, 1〉, and ≡ is the
total congruence. Now suppose 〈a, 0〉 ≡ 〈a, b〉. Then 〈a, 1〉 = ∼〈a, 0〉 ≡ ∼〈a, b〉 = 〈a, b〉, which
implies 〈1, 1〉 = ∇〈a, 1〉 ≡ ∇〈a, b〉 = 〈a, b〉. Hence 〈0, 0〉 ≡ 〈1, 1〉, and ≡ is the total congruence.
Finally, suppose 〈a, b〉 ≡ 〈a, c〉. Then 〈a, b〉 = ∇〈a, b〉 ≡ ∇〈a, c〉 = 〈1, 1〉. Hence ≡ is the total
congruence.
Proposition 3.17. M∇0 ∨ K∇ ⊂M∇01 .
Proof. Let 〈A,∇〉 be a simple monadic De Morgan algebra 〈A,∇〉 with a quantifier of type
1 such that A is not a Kleene algebra. Then 〈A,∇〉 /∈ M∇0 ∪ K∇, and by Lemma 3.14,
〈A,∇〉 /∈ M∇0 ∨ K∇.
We have shown that we can separate the monadic De Morgan algebras with quantifiers of
type 0 from those with quantifiers of type 1 or type 2 by means of an equation asserting that the
range of the quantifier is a Boolean algebra. We can separate the monadic De Morgan algebras
with quantifiers of type 0 or type 1 from those with quantifiers of type 2 by an equation asserting
that the range of the quantifier is a Kleene algebra. However what we cannot yet do is separate
those De Morgan algebras with type 1 quantifiers from those with type 0 or type 2 quantifiers.
In particular, is there a variety that includes all monadic Kleene algebras with a quantifier of
type 1 but not those with a quantifier of type 0? For starters, we should look for an equation
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that is true in 〈K,∇1〉 but false in 〈K,∇0〉. Let a be the fixed point of K. Notice that for all
x ∈ K,
∇1(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ ∼∇1(x ∧ ∼x),
while
∇0(a ∧ ∼a) 6≤ ∼∇0(a ∧ ∼a).
Proposition 3.18. Let 〈A,∇〉 be a monadic De Morgan algebra. If 〈A,∇〉 satisfies
∇(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ ∼∇(x ∧ ∼x),
then every fixed point of A is fixed by ∇.
Proof. First, suppose 〈A,∇〉 is subdirectly irreducible and satisfies ∇(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ ∼∇(x ∧∼x).
Then ∇ is a quantifier of type 0, type 1, or type 2. If c is a fixed point that is not fixed by ∇, then
∇c = 1 because any two distinct fixed points are incomparable. But then ∇(c ∧ ∼c) = ∇c = 1
and ∼∇(c ∧ ∼c) = 0, contrary to hypothesis.
Now let 〈A,∇〉 be any monadic De Morgan algebra that satisfies ∇(x∧∼x) ≤ ∼∇(x ∧∼x).
Every fixed point c in A corresponds to a tuple of fixed points in the subdirect representation
of A in which every coordinate is fixed by ∇. Hence c is fixed by ∇.
Corollary 3.19. Let 〈A,∇〉 be a subdirectly irreducible monadic De Morgan algebra that satisfies
∇(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ ∼∇(x ∧∼x). Then either
(a) A is a centered De Morgan algebra with exactly two fixed points, and ∇ is a quantifier of
type 2,
(b) A is a centered Kleene algebra, and ∇ is a quantifier of type 1, or
(c) A is a Boolean algebra, and ∇ is a quantifier of type 0.
Proof. Since ∇ is a quantifier of type 0, type 1, or type 2, and every fixed point in A is fixed by
∇, A can have at most two fixed points. Furthermore, if A has two distinct fixed points, then
∇ must be a quantifier of type 2.
If A has a unique fixed point c, then ∇ must be a quantifier of type 1. Suppose for the sake
of a contradiction that there exists an x ∈ A such that x ∧ ∼x 6≤ c. Then ∇(x ∧ ∼x) = 1 and
∼∇(x ∧ ∼x) = 0, contrary to hypothesis. Therefore, for every x, y ∈ A we have x ∧ ∼x ≤ c ≤
y ∨ ∼y. Hence A is a Kleene algebra.
If A is not centered, then ∇ must be a quantifier of type 0. Suppose for the sake of a
contradiction that there exists an x ∈ A such that x ∧ ∼x > 0. Then ∇(x ∧ ∼x) = 1 and
∼∇(x ∧ ∼x) = 0, contrary to hypothesis. Therefore A satisfies the equation x∧∼x = 0. Hence
A is a Boolean algebra.
Let M∇2 denote the variety of monadic De Morgan algebras that satisfy the equation
equivalent to ∇(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ ∼∇(x ∧∼x), and let K∇1 denote the variety of monadic Kleene
algebras that satisfy ∇(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ ∼∇(x ∧ ∼x).
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Proposition 3.20. The following diagram is a sublattice of the lattice of subvarieties of M∇.
M∇
M∇01 ∨M∇2
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mm
mm
mm
mm
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M∇01 M∇0 ∨M∇2
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mm
mm
mm
mm
mm
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
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M∇0 ∨ K∇
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
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QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
Q K
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mm
mm
mm
mm
mm
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LL
LL
LL
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LL
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QQ
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K∇0
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∇1
mm
mm
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Proof. Starting at the bottom, K∇0 ∧ K∇1 = B∇ by Corollary 3.19, and K∇0 ∨ K∇1 = K∇
because if 〈A,∇〉 is a subdirectly irreducible algebra in K∇, then either ∇ is of type 0 or 1. In
the first case 〈A,∇〉 ∈ K∇0 . In the second case, let a be the fixed point of A. Then for any
x ∈ A, x ∧ ∼x ≤ a, so ∇(x ∧ ∼x) ≤ a ≤ ∼∇(x ∧∼x). Hence 〈A,∇〉 ∈ K∇1 .
Moving up and to the right, K∇ ∧M∇2 = K∇1 by definition. The monadic Kleene algebra
〈K,∇0〉 belongs to K∇ \M∇2 , while 〈M,∇2〉 belongs toM∇2 \K∇, so neither K∇ ⊆M∇2 nor
M∇2 ⊆ K∇.
Moving left, M∇0 ∧ K∇ = K∇0 by definition. Also, 〈M,∇0〉 ∈ M∇0 \ K∇, and 〈K,∇1〉 ∈
K∇ \M∇0 . However, M∇0 ∨ K∇ ⊂M∇01 by Proposition 3.17.
Before moving right it will be useful to note that by Corollary 3.19, M∇0 ∧M∇2 = B∇ and
M∇01 ∧M∇2 = K∇1 . Also, 〈M,∇0〉 ∈ M
∇0 \M∇2 , while 〈M,∇2〉 ∈ M
∇2 \M∇01 . Thus
(M∇0 ∨ K∇) ∨ (K∇ ∨M∇2) =M∇0 ∨ K∇ ∨M∇2
=M∇0 ∨ (K∇0 ∨ K∇1) ∨M∇2
= (M∇0 ∨ K∇0 ) ∨ (K∇1 ∨M∇2)
=M∇0 ∨M∇2 .
By Corollary 3.15,
M∇01 ∧ (M∇0 ∨M∇2) = (M∇01 ∧M∇0) ∨ (M∇01 ∧M∇2)
=M∇0 ∨ K∇1
=M∇0 ∨ K∇.
Also, M∇01 ∨ (M∇0 ∨M∇2) = (M∇01 ∨M∇0) ∨M∇2 =M∇01 ∨M∇2 .
Finally to showM∇01 ∨M∇2 ⊂M∇ let a and b be the fixed points of M, and let A be the
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following subalgebra of M×M:
〈1, 1〉
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ww
ww
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FF
FF
FF
FF
〈a, 1〉
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GG
〈1, b〉
xx
xx
xx
xx
FF
FF
FF
FF
〈a, a〉
GG
GG
GG
GG
〈a, b〉
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ww
ww
ww
FF
FF
FF
FF
〈b, b〉
xx
xx
xx
xx
〈a, 0〉
GG
GG
GG
GG
〈0, b〉
xx
xx
xx
xx
〈0, 0〉
Observe that 〈a, a〉 and 〈b, b〉 are fixed points in A such that 〈a, a〉 ∧ 〈b, b〉 = 〈0, 0〉 and 〈a, a〉 ∨
〈b, b〉 = 〈1, 1〉. Let ∇ be the type 2 quantifier whose range is
{〈0, 0〉, 〈a, a〉, 〈b, b〉, 〈1, 1〉}.
Then 〈A,∇〉 is a monadic De Morgan algebra that does not belong to M∇01 ∪M∇2 , on the one
hand because ∇ is a quantifier of type 2, and on the other hand because 〈a, b〉 is a fixed point
that is not fixed by ∇. In order to apply Lemma 3.14 we need to show that 〈A,∇〉 is subdirectly
irreducible. In fact, 〈A,∇〉 is simple. We perform three representative calculations. Let ≡ be
a congruence on 〈A,∇〉. If 〈0, 0〉 ≡ 〈a, 0〉, then 〈0, 0〉 = ∇〈0, 0〉 ≡ ∇〈a, 0〉 = ∇〈a, a〉 = 〈a, a〉,
in which case 〈0, 0〉 ≡ 〈a, a〉 = ∼〈a, a〉 ≡ 〈1, 1〉. Hence ≡ is the total congruence. Similarly,
if 〈0, 0〉 ≡ 〈0, b〉, then ≡ is the total congruence. If 〈a, 0〉 ≡ 〈a, a〉, then 〈a, b〉 ≡ 〈a, 1〉, and
〈1, b〉 ≡ 〈1, 1〉. Hence 〈0, 0〉 = ∼〈1, 1〉 ≡ ∼〈1, b〉 = 〈0, b〉, so ≡ is the total congruence. If
〈a, a〉 ≡ 〈a, b〉, then 〈a, a〉 = ∇〈a, a〉 ≡ ∇〈a, b〉 = 〈1, 1〉, so ≡ is the total congruence. Thus
〈A,∇〉 is simple. Therefore 〈A,∇〉 does not belong to M∇01 ∨M∇2 .
3.3 The monadic De Morgan reduct
Let X be a one-dimensional pair of suits. It follows from Corollary 2.50 that
C0,{0}(X) =

1 if X 6≤ Ω and X 6≤ ℧,
Ω if 0 < X ≤ Ω,
℧ if 0 < X ≤ ℧,
0 if X = 0.
If X is a double suit, then
C0,{0}(X) =

1 if X 6≤ Ω,
Ω if 0 < X ≤ Ω,
0 if X = 0.
Thus the reduct of a suited IFG1-algebra that includes Ω and℧ to the signature 〈0, 1, ∪,+{0}, ·{0}, C0,{0}〉
is a monadic De Morgan algebra with a quantifier of type 2, while the same reduct of a double-
suited IFG1-algebra that includes Ω is a monadic Kleene algebra with a quantifier of type 1. We
will refer to the reduct of a suited IFG1-algebra C to the signature
〈0, 1, ∪,+{0}, ·{0}, C0,{0}〉
as the monadic De Morgan reduct of C. It follows that the variety generated by the monadic
De Morgan reducts of all suited IFG1-algebras is contained in M∇.
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Proposition 3.21. If X is a double suit, then
C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X ·N X
∪) ≤ C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X ·N X
∪)∪.
Proof. If X is a double suit, then 0 ≤ X ·N X∪ ≤ Ω. If X ·N X∪ = 0, then
C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X ·N X
∪) = 0 and C0,∅ . . . CN−1,∅(X ·N X
∪)∪ = 1.
If 0 < X ·N X
∪ ≤ Ω, then
C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X ·N X
∪) = Ω = C0,J0 . . . CN−1,JN−1(X ·N X
∪)∪.
In particular, in the one-dimensional case C0,{0}(X ·{0} X
∪) ≤ C0,{0}(X ·{0} X
∪)∪. Thus
the variety generated by the monadic De Morgan reducts of all double-suited IFG1-algebras is
contained in K∇1 .
Conjecture. The variety generated by the monadic De Morgan reducts of all double-suited
IFG1-algebras is K∇1 .
To prove the conjecture it would be sufficient to show that every monadic Kleene algebra in
K∇1 is a homomorphic image of a subalgebra of a product of De Morgan reducts of double-suited
IFG1-algebras. By Corollary 3.19 it suffices to consider monadic Kleene algebras with type 1
quantifiers and monadic Boolean algebras with type 0 quantifiers.
Definition. Let L be a lattice. An element a ∈ L is join irreducible if a = x ∨ y implies a = x
or a = y. Dually, b ∈ L is meet irreducible if b = x ∧ y implies b = x or b = y.
Proposition 3.22. In any De Morgan reduct of a suited IFGN -algebra 0 is meet irreducible
and 1 is join irreducible.
Proof. Let C be a the De Morgan reduct of a double-suited IFGN -algebra, and let X,Y ∈ C. If
X +N Y = 1, then
NA ∈ (X +N Y )+ = X+ ∪ Y +. If NA ∈ X+ then X = 1, and if NA ∈ Y +
then Y = 1.
It follows that not every Kleene algebra is isomorphic to a double-suited IFG1-algebra. For
example, let K be the following Kleene algebra with fixed point c:
1
}}
}}
}}
}}
AA
AA
AA
AA
a
BB
BB
BB
BB
b
||
||
||
||
c
||
||
||
||
BB
BB
BB
BB
∼b
AA
AA
AA
AA
∼a
}}
}}
}}
}}
0
Observe that 0 is not meet irreducible, and 1 is not join irreducible, so K cannot be embedded
into any suited IFGN -algebra. Perhaps every monadic Kleene algebra with a type 1 quantifier
in which 0 is meet irreducible and 1 is join irreducible is isomorphic to the De Morgan reduct of
a double-suited IFG1-algebra. However, my advisor J. Donald Monk and I have only been able
to prove the following partial result.
Theorem 3.23. Every monadic Kleene algebra with a quantifier of type 1 in which 0 is meet
irreducible and 1 is join irreducible is isomorphic to the De Morgan reduct of a rooted IFG1-
algebra.
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Proof. Let 〈K,∇〉 be a monadic Kleene algebra with a quantifier of type 1 in which 0 is meet
irreducible and 1 is join irreducible. Let c be the fixed point of K, and consider the interval
L = [c, 1] as a bounded distributive lattice with minimum c and maximum 1. Let A be the set
of prime filters on L, and let σ be the Priestley isomorphism x 7→ {F ∈ A | x ∈ F }. Since 1 is
join irreducible we have that {1} is a prime filter, and for all x ∈ L, {1} ∈ σ(x) if and only if
x = 1.
There is a partition P of P(A) such that |P | = |A|, every cell of the partition includes a
singleton, but no two singletons belong to the same cell. Let f : A→ P be a bijection such that
for all a ∈ A, {a} ∈ f(a), and A ∈ f({1}). Define g : P(A)→ P(P(A)) \ {∅} by
g(U) = {∅} ∪
⋃
a∈U
f(a).
If U 6= V , then without loss of generality there is a b ∈ U \V . Consequently f(b) ⊆ g(U)\ g(V ).
Since f(b) is nonempty, g(U) 6= g(V ). Hence g is injective. Note that there is a singleton
{a} ∈ g(U) if and only if U is nonempty, and A ∈ g(U) if and only if {1} ∈ U .
Let G = g ◦ σ. Note that
G(c) = g(σ(c)) = g(∅) = {∅},
G(1) = g(σ(1)) = g(A) = P(A),
G(x ∨ y) = g(σ(x ∨ y)) = g(σ(x) ∪ σ(y)) = g(σ(x)) ∪ g(σ(y)) = G(x) ∪G(y).
To prove G(x ∧ y) = G(x) ∩G(y) we need to show that
{∅} ∪
⋃
a∈σ(x)∩σ(y)
f(a) =
{∅} ∪ ⋃
a∈σ(x)
f(a)
 ∩
{∅} ∪ ⋃
b∈σ(y)
f(b)
 .
Suppose u is a nonempty member of the left-hand side. Then for some a ∈ σ(x)∩σ(y), u ∈ f(a).
That is, there is a prime filter a such that x, y ∈ a and u ∈ f(a), which is enough to show that u
belongs to the right-hand side. Conversely, suppose v is a nonempty member of the right-hand
side. Then for some a ∈ σ(x) and some b ∈ σ(y), v ∈ f(a) and v ∈ f(b). However, if a and b
were distinct, f(a) and f(b) would be disjoint. Thus a = b, and v belongs to the left-hand side.
The function G is injective because g and σ are. Also note that there is a singleton {a} ∈
G(x) whenever x > c, and A ∈ G(x) if and only if {1} ∈ σ(x) if and only if x = 1.
Define a function h from 〈K,∇〉 to the monadic De Morgan reduct of Root1(A) by h(x) =
〈G(x ∨ c), G(∼x ∨ c)〉. If x 6= y, then either x ∨ c 6= y ∨ c or ∼x ∨ c 6= ∼y ∨ c because in a
distributive lattice x ∨ c = y ∨ c and x ∧ c = y ∧ c imply x = y. Thus h is injective.
To show that h is a homomorphism, observe that
h(0) = 〈G(0 ∨ c), G(1 ∨ c)〉 = 〈G(c), G(1)〉 = 〈{∅}, P(A)〉 = 0,
h(1) = 〈G(1 ∨ c), G(0 ∨ c)〉 = 〈G(1), G(c)〉 = 〈P(A), {∅}〉 = 1,
h(∼x) = 〈G(∼x ∨ c), G(x ∨ c)〉 = h(x)∪,
h(x ∨ y) = 〈G((x ∨ y) ∨ c), G(∼(x ∨ y) ∨ c)〉
= 〈G((x ∨ c) ∨ (y ∨ c)), G((∼x ∨ c) ∧ (∼y ∨ c))〉
= 〈G(x ∨ c) ∪G(y ∨ c), G(∼x ∨ c) ∩G(∼y ∨ c)〉
= h(x) +{0} h(y).
Now we check the quantifier:
h(∇0) = h(0) = 0 = C0,{0}(0) = C0,{0}(h(0)).
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If 0 < x ≤ c, then x ∨ c = c and ∼x ∨ c < 1. Hence G(x ∨ c) = {∅} and A /∈ G(∼x ∨ c). Thus
h(∇x) = h(c) = 〈G(c), G(c)〉 = Ω = C0,{0}(〈G(x ∨ c), G(∼x ∨ c)〉) = C0,{0}(h(x)).
If x 6≤ c, then x ∨ c > c and ∼x ∨ c < 1. Hence there is a singleton {a} ∈ G(x ∨ c) and
A /∈ G(∼x ∨ c). Thus
h(∇x) = h(1) = 1 = C0,{0}(〈G(x ∨ c), G(∼x ∨ c)〉) = C0,{0}(h(x)).
by Lemma 2.49. Therefore h is an embedding.
Note that Theorem 3.23 does not resolve the conjecture because the elements in the range
of h are not double suits (or even pairs of suits).
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